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DOES WHAT WORKS FOR ".COM"
ALSO WORK FOR ".CN"?:
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA
FANG FANGt & JIARui Liutt

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Beijing First Intermediate People's Court received the first
cybersquatting case in China, Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye, in April 1999,
Chinese courts had received more than forty cybersquatting cases by
July 2001. Internationally well-known trademarks, such as "Tide,"
"Ikea," and "Safeguard," have been involved in cybersquatting claims.'
Although Chinese courts promptly reacted to this newly emerging question, absence of pertinent legal rules resulted in uncertainty and inconsistency in decisions from different courts. The Trademark Law and
Anti-Unfair Competition Law of China, were quoted by most courts as
legal basis, however they failed to provide sufficient remedies against
cybersquatting.
In order to mend the flow in current statutes and to accommodate
the need for regulating cybersquatting, on July 24, 2001, the Supreme
People's Court issued a judicial interpretation titled Interpretation of
Several Issues on Application of Laws to Civil Cases Involving Computer
Network Domain Names ("The Interpretations"), 2 as a guideline for all
Chinese courts in deciding cybersquatting cases. The Interpretationsis
t Fang Fang: Legal Researcher, Baker & McKenzie Shanghai Office; LL.M. 2001,
University of Washington; LL.B. 1997, East China University of Politics and Law.
tt Jiarui Liu: Ph.D. Candidate, China Academy of Social Sciences; LL.M. 2002, University of Washington; LL.B. 1997, East China University of Politics and Law.
1. Jiang Zhipei, Speech, China Internet Conference Meeting (July 10, 2001) <http:/!
cnnic.net.cn/policy/33.shtml>. Jiang Zhipei is the chief judge of the Third Civil Tribunal of
the Supreme Court of China.
2. In August 15, 2000, Beijing Higher People's Court issued "Several Guiding Opinions on the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Intellectual PropertyDisputes Arising from the

542

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XX

the consolidation of all prior judicial experience and is deemed as the
latest achievement of China's fight against cybersquatting.
As the cradle of Global Information Infrastructure, the United
States was the first country faced with the challenge of cybersquatting
and has accumulated the most sophisticated experience in dealing with
this problem. Therefore, China courts have frequently made reference to
their U.S. counterparts while handling cybersquatting cases. This also
explains the fact that The Interpretations largely follow the U.S. model,
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct ("ACPA").
By a closer observation, we may however, discover that significant
differences still exist between these two countries in their legislative and
judicial practices as pertaining to cybersquatting. Some such differences
may result from China's civil law tradition as opposed to America's common law tradition. The other differences result from China's limited experience and insufficient understanding in the legal and technological
complexity of the cybersquatting problems.
This article, by the means of comparative study of the anti-cybersquatting legal systems in the United States and China, aims to find out
whether, and to what extent, China can transplant the United State's
experience to construct her own effective legal mechanisms against
cybersquatters.
Here, it is necessary to clarify the coverage of this article. The Chinese part of this article focuses specifically on cybersquatting of ".cn" domain names which are reserved the with China Internet Network
Information Center ("CNNIC"). 3 So far Chinese courts have not coped
with any disputes with respect to genetic domain names such as ".com."
Besides, this article does not discuss any non-governmental domain
name dispute resolution policies but focuses primarily on legislation and
judicial practice of these two countries.
Part II of this article discusses how trademark law is used against
cybersquatting in United States and in China. Part III discusses how
dilution is used as a cause of action against cybersquatting in the United
States and how Chinese courts apply "special protection of well-known
trademark," an inquiry similar to dilution, in cybersquatting cases. Part
Registration and Use of Domain Names" [hereinafter Guiding Opinions] (governing courts
within the territory of Beijing Municipality only).
3. China Internet Network Information Center, A Brief Introduction of CNNIC
<http://cnnic.net.cn/e-about.shtml> (accessed Jan. 25, 2002) (stating that CNNIC is a nonprofit organization founded on June 3, 1997 under the leadership of the Ministry of Information Industry). Domain name reservation service is one of CNNIC's most important
functions and CNNIC. Id. CNNIC is in charge of ".cn" domain names reservation, IP address distribution, and autonomous system codes distribution in China. Id. Generally
speaking, CNNIC's function is similar to that of the Internet Corporation of Name and
Numbers. Id.
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IV discusses how Chinese courts use anti-unfair competition law to fight
against cybersquatting. Part V addresses the United States anti-cybersquatting legislation and tries to sketch a blueprint of future anti-cybersquatting legislation in China, based on the United State's experience
and China's existing judicial practice.
II.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST CYBERSQUATTING

Both the United States and China have witnessed some disadvantages in using the trademark infringement claim, which requires the
likelihood of confusion test as a cause of action against cybersquatting.
In the Lanham Act, one of the requirements for trademark infringement
is that the accused use of a registered trademark shall be "in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services," 4 and the accused use of an unregistered trademark shall be
"inconnection with any goods or services, or any container for goods." 5
However, cybersquatters do not often use the domain name in the abovementioned manners, thus their acts do not literally constitute trademark
infringement. Plaintiffs have also had some difficulty in proving the accused use was likely to cause confusion. 6 In China, the requirement for
the manner of the accused use is even higher, the accused use shall be7
"inrespect of the same or similar goods" as the trademark owner's.
Therefore, in both countries, trademark infringement is not always able
to catch cybersquatters. What is more, in both countries, remedies for
trademark infringement cannot satisfy trademark owners even when
trademark infringement is established.
A.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT BY LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN

LAvHAm ACT

1.

Liability

The Lanham Act creates civil liability for the infringement of a registered trademark, it requires the plaintiff to plead and prove the following elements:
1. the defendant use [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark;
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
5. Id. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
6. See Danielle Weinberg Swartz, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing
Domain Name Disputes, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1487, 1491-1500 (1998) (discussing the disadvantages of using trademark cause of actions to fight against cybersquatting).
7. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 38 (China) [hereinafter
Trademark Law]; Detailed Implementing Rules of the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 41 (China) [hereinafter Detailed Rules].
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without the consent of the registrant;
in interstate commerce;
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services; [and]
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
8
deceive.

The Lanham Act also creates civil liability for the infringement of
unregistered trademarks. It requires the plaintiff to plead and prove:
1. the defendants use [of] any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation
of fact;
2. in commerce;
3. in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods;
[and]
4. such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the defendant with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
9
another person.
Use of a domain name by a cybersquatter in certain manners may fit
within the above requirements and may be subject to civil liability. For
example, if a domain name similar to the trademark is used without permission of the trademark owner in a commercial sense, such as "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any
goods or services in a context that is likely to cause confusion, mistake or
deception with a previously used mark," trademark infringement can occur. 1° Each element is presented below separately.
a.

In Commerce

To trigger the language of the Lanham Act, the defendant's use of
plaintiffs mark must be "in commerce" within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Courts have not had much trouble in finding use of a domain
name on the Internet to meet the requirement of "in commerce." In
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci,1 i the court
found the defendant's use of "www.plannedparenthood.com," which is
identical to the plaintiffs registered trademark "Planned Parenthood,"
as their domain name met the "in commerce" requirement for two reasons. First, defendant's actions affected plaintiffs ability to offer plain8. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (2000).
9. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
10. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy On Trademarks And Unfair Competition § 25:71
(4th ed., West 2001).
11. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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tiffs services online. Since plaintiffs services, which was being offered
in forty-eight states and over the Internet, is surly "in commerce," thus,
even assuming that defendant's activities are not "in commerce" within
the Lanham Act's purpose, the effect of those activities on plaintiffs commerce activities would place defendant within the reach of the Lanham
Act. "Second, Internet users constitute a national, even international,
audience, who must use interstate phone lines to access defendant's Web
site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a typical homepage for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham
Act's "in commerce" requirement. 12 Therefore, essentially any use of a
13
domain name on the Internet satisfies the "in commerce" requirement.
b.

Commercial Use

For infringement of federally registered trademarks, the Lanham
Act requires that the accused use be "in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distributing, or advertising of any goods or services."' 4 For infringement of unregistered trademarks, the Lanham Act requires that
the accused use be "on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods." 15 16 In cybersquatting cases, this is not a factor in
favor of trademark owners.
In some cases, for example, in Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. v. Bucci, the court found that the defendant's use triggered
§32(1) and §43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act because the defendant used the
accused domain name in connection with the distribution or advertising
of goods or services. 1 7 In this case, the court also found that the defendant's use was an infringement of the plaintiffs unregistered trademark
rights because the defendant used the domain name "on or in connection
with any goods or services" and it was a designation which was likely to
12. Id. at *3.
13. Mark A. Lemley et al., Software and Internet Law 823-24 (Aspen 2001).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
15. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
16. McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 25:76. McCarthy read these requirements in this way:
for trademark infringement (as well as dilution) to be actionable under the Lanham Act,
the accused user must use the challenged designation "in some commercial sense." Id.
Therefore, mere reservation of a domain name, without use in connection with any commercial enterprise, does not trigger infringement by confusion (or dilution) under the Lanham Act. Id.
17. Planned Parenthood,1997 WL 133313, at *4. The rationale for the court decision
are as follows: First, the defendant used the Web page to help the sale of a book. Id. The
materials on the Web site, which were similar to a publisher's home page, is related to the
advertising and distributing of the book. Id. Second, defendant offered its own set of information services in the Web site and defendant's use of plaintiffs mark is in connection with
the distribution of those services over the Internet. Id. at *5. Third, defendant's domain
name was used 'in connection with" the plaintiffs goods and services because it is likely to
prevent some Internet users from reaching plaintiffs own Web site. Id.

546

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XX

cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the affiliation, connection or
association to the origin of the "goods, services or commercial activities"
8
of the accused entity.'
However, unlike the situation in the above case, most cybersquatters do not use the domain name on a Web site that promotes goods or
provides service. This fact causes trouble to the plaintiff. For example,
Mr. Dennis Toeppen reserved the domain name "www.panavision.com,"
which is identical to Panavision Int'l L.P.'s registered trademark
"Panavision." He did not use the trademark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distributing or advertising of any goods or services, but
simply put the picture of a city named "Pana" on the Web site. 19 In
many cases, cybersquatters may not even activate their domain names.
They may merely warehouse the domain names without using them at
all. In those circumstances, the requirement of the Lanham Act may
never be met.
There is an opinion that "neither merely reserving a domain name
nor use of a domain name solely to indicate a site on the Internet, in and
of itself, constitutes 'goods or services' within the Lanham Act sense.
Rather, one must consider the content of the Web site identified by the
domain name." 20 If this opinion, which is in accord with traditional
trademark law theory, is accepted, the cybersquatters are left with more
room to play within the Lanham Act.
c.

Likelihood of Confusion

The test for likelihood of confusion is the touchstone of trademark
infringement. 2 1 Infringements of federally registered marks are governed by a determination of whether the defendant's use is "likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 22 A federal claim for
infringement of an unregistered mark is also triggered by a use which "is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association" of the user with the senior user.2 3 The
same test is applied when the use of a domain name is claimed to consti18. Id. at *4
19. PanavisionInt'l L.P. v Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998). In this case,
the court "stretched" the definition of "commercial use" and held the defendant's reservation of the domain name and attempt to sell the domain name back to the plaintiff constituted "commercial use." Id. The reasoning of this case will be discussed later in this
article. However, the court did find the use of"www.panavison.com" on a Web site showing
a picture of a city constitute "commercial use" in its traditional sense. Id.
20. See McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 25:76.
21. Id. at § 23:1.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
23. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
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tute trademark infringement. This test is no more favorable to trademark owner than the commercial use requirement.
Based on the traditional fundamental factors to be considered in determining the presence or absence of a likelihood of confusion, 24 federal
circuits have created various lists of factors, which are slightly different
from each other. 25 The Restatement of Torts spelled out the following
eight factors relevant to the determinations of likelihood of confusion:
1. The degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations;
2. the similarity of the marketing methods and channels of
distribution;
3. the characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of
care they exercise;
4. the degree of distinctiveness of the senior user's mark;
5. where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood that
prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand into the
field of the junior user;
6. where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the extent to which the senior user's designation is known in the junior
user's territory;
7. the intent of the junior user; 2 [and]
6
8. evidence of actual confusion.
These factors are also considered when the use of a domain name is
claimed to constitute trademark infringement. By considering the "degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations," if the accused
domain name is not sufficiently similar to the plaintiffs mark, infringement may not be found. By considering the competition between and the
similarity of the goods or services provided by the defendant and the
plaintiff, even if the accused domain name is identical to the senior
user's mark, if the goods or services advertised at the Web site are sufficiently distinct from those identified by the mark, there will be no likeli24. Restatement of Torts § 731 (1938). The classic test set out nine foundational factors
to be considered in determining likelihood of confusion for non-competitive goods: 1) the
likelihood that the actor's goods, services or business will be mistaken for those of the
other; 2) the likelihood that the other may expand his business so as to compete with the
actor; 3) the extent to which the goods or services of the actor and those of the other have
common purchasers or users; 4) the extent to which the goods or services of the actor and
those of the other are marketed through the same channels; 5) the relation between the
functions of the goods or services of the actor and those of the other; 6) the degree of distinctiveness of the trademark or trade name; 7) the degree of attention usually given to trade
symbols in the purchase of goods or services of the actor and those of the other; 8) the
length of time during which the actor has used the designation; and 9) the intent of the
actor in adopting and using the designation. Id.; see also McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 23:19.
25. Id. The Second Circuit developed the eight-factor "Polaroid"test, which was originally used only in determination of likelihood of confusion of non-competing goods or service, but now applies to that of competing goods or services as well. Id. The Ninth Circuit
has developed the eight-factor "Sleekcraft" test. Id. at § 23:21.
26. Id. at § 23:19.
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hood of confusion. 2 7 Weighing the factors of similarity of the marketing
methods and channels of distribution, characteristics of the prospective
purchasers and the degree of care they exercise, intent of the junior user
and evidence of actual confusion often times lead to result in favor of the
2s
cybersquatter.
2.

Remedy

The Lanham Act provides several kinds of remedy to the plaintiff
when infringement is established. However, in cybersquatting cases,
those remedies do not always suffice. One of the remedies that the Lanham Act provides is injunction. In actions arising out of use of counterfeit marks in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of
goods or services, the court may, grant an order providing for the seizure
of goods and counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the means
of making such marks, and records documenting the manufacture, sale,
or receipt of those things involved in such violation. 2 9 In cybersquatting
cases, this remedy does not make any sense.
The Lanham Act also provides damages as a remedy. When infringement of registered trademark or infringement of unregistered
trademark under §43 of the Lanham Act is established, the plaintiff
shall be entitled to recover actual damages and profit, which include defendant's profits, any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and the costs of
the action. 30 In a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services,
the plaintiff may also elect to get statutory damages instead of actual
31
damages and profit.
Here comes the problem: cancellation of the reservation scheme or
transfer of the disputed domain name is not available under this remedy,
while such remedy makes the most sense to plaintiff in cybersquatting
case, because their true intent is to be able to use the trademark domain
names themselves or, at least, to stop the defendant from using them.
27. See e.g. Hasbro Inc. v. Clue Computing Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999).
Hasbro was the owner of rights in the mark CLUE for a popular board game. Id. Clue
Computing Inc. reserved the domain name "www.clue.com." Id. at 119. Clue Computing
Inc.'s Web site identified by this domain name is used to advertise the company's computer
consulting business. Id. The court found that Hasbro failed to prove that there was a
likelihood that consumers would confuse Clue Computing's "www.clue.com" Web site on
computer consulting business with Hasbro's game. Id. at 137.
28. See generally Intermatic, Inc. v.Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denying Intermatic's motion for summary judgment on the trademark infringement because the
court found that question of fact existed regarding the "area and manner of use," "degree of
care likely to be exercised by consumers," and "actual confusion").
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2000).
30. Id. § 1117(a).
31. Id. § 1117(c).
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Lack of such remedy makes trademark infringement litigation less helpful to the trademark owner.
3.

Comments

To constitute trademark infringement based on likelihood of confusion, the defendant must reserve the domain name, and the cybersquatter must also activate the domain name and use it in connection with
sale, offering for sale, and the distribution of goods or services. However,
as mentioned above, many cybersquatters reserve domain names without using them in the commercial sense, or without activating them at
all. In such circumstances, trademark infringement cannot be
established.
Even when infringement is established, traditional trademark infringement remedies may not be able to satisfy trademark owners since
the traditional remedies do not include cancellation or transfer of domain name, which enable the plaintiffs to use their trademark as a domain name. Therefore, it is fair to say that the experience within the
United States has made it clear that trademark infringement claims
based on likelihood of confusion are not an adequate tool to help the
trademark owners fight against cybersquatters.
B.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN CHINA

In China, like the United States, trademark infringement is based
on the likelihood that confusion maybe established when a trademark is
reserved and/or used, as a domain name by someone other than the
trademark owner. The Trademark Law of China, and Detailed Implementing Rules of Trademark Law of China and international conventions, 32 which constitute a part of the Chinese trademark law regime,
are the basic laws that are applied in cybersquatting cases, if the plain33
tiff raise the suit based on trademark infringement.
Generally, in trademark infringement cases, when deciding whether
the defendant's acts constitute infringement, Chinese judges go through
a three step analysis. First, they examine whether the plaintiff owns the
32. The convention that will be talked about most is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 11851 U.N.T.S. 305-388 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
33. In addition to these statutes, the interpretations issued by the Supreme People's
Court, which are binding upon the lower court, could be also be called a part of trademark
law system. However, the interpretations will not be discussed in this Comment because,
first, judicial interpretation was promulgated on July 24, 2001 and had no influence on the
trademark law system before then, so will have nothing to do with the discussion here.
Second, it makes more sense to discuss these interpretations as a part of the blueprint for
future anti-cybersquatting legislation, and compare it with U.S.'s special legislation in Part
V of the accompanying text.
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exclusive right to use the disputed trademark. If the plaintiff does, the
next step is to examine whether any of the defendant's acts fall into the
category of infringing acts, a list these infringing acts are provided in
Article 3834 of the TrademarkLaw and are completed by Article 41 of the
Detailed Rules. 35 The analysis of likelihood of confusion is built into
these articles. When both of the above conditions are met, the last step
is to examine whether the defendant's infringing acts causes damage to
the plaintiff.3 6 By going through these three steps, the built-in analysis
of likelihood of confusion is applied. The following part, while showing
how the Trademark Law is applied to cybersquatting cases, will discuss
the limitation of the trademark infringement claim as a cause of action
against cybersquatting.
1.

Plaintiffs Rights

According to the Trademark Law, a registered trademark owner enjoys an exclusive ownership right in the trademark. On one hand, a registered trademark owner has the exclusive right to use the registered
trademark on goods or services in respect of which the use of the trademark has been approved. 3 7 On the other hand, the owner has the right
to exclude others from "using on the same or similar goods, words or
34. Trademark Law, supra n. 7, at Art. 38. This article says:
Any of the following acts shall be an infringement of the exclusive right to use a
registered trademark: 1. to use a trademark that is identical with or similar to a
registered trademark in respect of the same or similar goods without the authorization of the proprietor of the registered trademark; 2. to sell goods that he knows
bear a counterfeited registered trademark; 3. to counterfeit, or to make, without
authorization, representations of a registered trademark of another person, or to
sell such representations of a registered trademark as were counterfeited, or made
without authorization; 4. to cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive
right of another person to use a registered trademark.
Id.
35. Detailed Rules, supra n. 7, at Art. 41. This article says:
Any of the following acts shall constitute an infringement of the exclusive right to
use a registered trademark as referred to in Article 38 (4) of the Trademarks Law:
1. to deal in the goods that he knows or he should know have been involved in an
infringement of the exclusive right of antoher person to use a registered trademark; 2. to use any word or device that is identical with or similar to the registered
trademark of another person, in respect of the same or similar goods, as the designation or dcoration of the goods, which is so sufficient as to mislead the public; and
3. to provide any person intentionally with such facilities as of storage, transportation, post service and concealment in his infringing the exclusive right of another
person to use a registered trademark.
Id.
36. Jiang Zhipei, Zhishichangquan Qinquan Zeren Goucheng [The Elements of Civil
Responsibility of Intellectual Property Infringement] <http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/fgrtl
fgrt34.htm#1> (accessed Mar. 5, 2001).
37. Trademark Law, supra n. 7, at Art. 3. "The trademark registrant shall enjoy an
exclusive right to use the trademark, which shall be protected by law." Id. "The exclusive
right to use a registered trademark is limited to the trademark which has been approved
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graphs which are identical with or similar to that of others' registered
trade marks as the designation or adornment of the goods, and which is
sufficient to cause mis-recognition." 38 As far as cybersquatting is concerned, this stipulation has two limitations. First, no stipulation is made
to the registered trademark owners' exclusive right to use its trademark
in situations other than on its goods or services, which includes its use as
a domain name. Second, unregistered trademarks are basically not protected by the Trademark Law, therefore the reservation and/or use of an
unregistered trademark as a domain name is not prohibited by the
Trademark Law.

39

During a trial, to prove the exclusive ownership right to- a trademark, the plaintiff needs merely to provide the trademark registration
record from the Trademark Bureau. A defendant, however, may go to
the Trademark Bureau to challenge the legitimacy of this exclusive
right. 40 However, even if the defendant raised a challenge as to the legitimacy of the registration of plaintiffs trademark, the court will still
assume the legitimacy until the Trademark Bureau cancels the registration. For example, during the trial of Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye,4 1 Mitan
Jiaye challenged Fulande's registration of "PDA" on the basis that "PDA"
for registration and to the goods in respect of which the use of the trademark has been
approved." Id. at Art. 37.
38. DetailedRules, supra n. 7, at Art. 41. "[T]o use any word or device that is identical
with or similar to the registered trademark of another person, in respect of the same or
similar goods, as the designation or decoration of the goods, which is so sufficient as to
mislead the public" constitutes trademark infringement. Id.
39. Trademark Law, supra n. 7, at Art. 3. "The trademark registrant shall enjoy an
exclusive right to use the trademark, which shall be protected by law." Id. Also, the title of
Chapter VII of the Chinese Trademark Law is "Protection of the Exclusive Rights to Use
Registered Trademarks," which means it deals only with the protection of registered trademark. Trademark Law, supra n. 7, at ch. 8. There is no article dealing with the protection
of the right owner's right on unregistered trademark in other parts of the statute. See generally id.
40. Trademark Law, supra n. 7, at Art. 2. There are two kinds of basis for challenging
a trademark registration: one is that the registration of the trademark was wrong from the
very beginning either because the trademark includes words or devices which shall not be
included in a registered trademark or because the registration of a trademark was acquired
by fraud or any other unfair means. Id. at Art. 8, 27. The other kind of challenge is that
the registrant have invalidated its exclusive right to use the registered trademark after
registration by changing the registration items or transferring the trademark without notifying the Trademark Bureau, by not using the trademark for three consecutive years, or by
cheating the consumers. Id. at Art. 30-31.
41. Fulandev. MitianJiaye, [1999] Yi Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 48 [Beijing First Intermediate
Court IP First Trial No. 48] (China). In this case, Fulande registered "PDA" in Product
Category 9 (computer and its outside equipment, Chinese/English Palm Notebook). Mitian
Jiaye reserved the domain name "www.pda.com.cn" and use the Web site under this domain name to sell Palm books from different manufacturers. Id. Palm book falls in Category 9, Fulande then sue Miatian Jiaye for trademark infringement. Id.
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was relating to generic name of plaintiffs goods. The Trademark Bureau
canceled the registration after the court decision was made. The court
did not consider the materials that the plaintiff brought before the court,
which were enough to convince the Trademark Bureau that the registration was illegal, and assumed the legitimacy of the plaintiffs right to
42
"PDA" when making its decision.
Although it is easy for a plaintiff to prove his exclusive right on their
registered trademark, the exclusive right is not of huge value in a cybersquatting related case, since the right does not include the exclusive
right to reserve and to use the trademark as a domain name. Owners of
unregistered trademarks have a hard time just proving the existence of
their right. As was mentioned above, unregistered trademarks are basically not protected under the Trademark Law. To make things worse,
the exception that a "well-known" trademark in other member countries
of the Paris Convention is protected under the Trademark Law with or
without being registered in China, which may save a trademark owner
plaintiff in many traditional trademark disputes, does not work as well
in cybersquatting cases. 4 3 The reason is that, in such cases, the court
will inevitably face the explanation of "being... used for identical or similar goods" in Article 6 of ParisConvention. Reading it literally, the Paris
Convention required a prohibition of the use of the mark "which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation" of a well-known
mark in another country only when the mark and the well-known mark
are used for identical or similar goods. Then there comes the question
42. Id.
43. See Paris Convention, supra n. 32, at Art. 6 his.
The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at
the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to
prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or
a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well-known in that country as
being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and
used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the
essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark
or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith. (2) A period of at least five
years from the date of registration shall be allowed for requesting the cancellation
of such a mark. The countries of the Union may provide for a period within which
the prohibition of use must be requested. (3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibition of the use of marks registered or used
in bad faith.
Id. According to this article, China, as a member country, is responsible for protecting a
trademark not being registered in China to the degree of its own trademark law, when the
trademark is considered "well-known" in the country where it is registered or used. Id. It
is China's conventional duty to prohibit the use of a trademark which "constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion of a mark considered by
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well-known mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of the Convention and used for identical or similar goods."
Id.
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whether the reservation and/or use of a well-known mark in a foreign
country as a ".cn" domain name constitutes "use for identical or similar
goods." Chinese court has so far not met with a case that an unregistered trademark, which is well-known in a foreign country, is cybersquatted in China. However, there is a sign that the court was not
enthusiastic in giving the Paris Convention a broad explanation that
plaintiff needs. In Ikea Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., 4 the
plaintiff invoked the Paris Convention as one of the legal basis for its
trademark infringement claim and the defendant rebuked that the
"Paris Convention's protection on well-known trademark is limited to
preventing persons other than the trademark owner from using a mark
identical with or similar to the well-known mark for identical or similar
goods." 4 5 The court failed to address this question in its analysis. 4 6 The
court's unwillingness to address this question is by no means a good sign
for unregistered well-known trademark owners.
All in all, in cybersquatting cases, registered trademark owners can
easily prove their exclusive right over their trademark, but cannot prove
they have the exclusive right to reserve and to use the trademark as
domain name. Situations are even worse for unregistered trademark
owners, when someone else reserved their trademark as domain name,
the trademark owner plaintiffs are generally out of luck, because they
are not even able to prove their right over the mark.
2.

Infringement Acts Stipulated by Law and Damage to the Plaintiff

After determination of the legitimacy of the plaintiffs right, next
steps are to examine whether any of the defendant's acts falls into category of infringement act in the Trademark Law and whether these acts
bring damage to the plaintiff. Sadly enough, in most cybersquatting
cases, reservation and/or use of other's trademark as domain name, falls
outside the list of infringing acts in the Trademark Law, which courts
usually consider to be exhaustive.
Article 38 of the Trademark Law specifies three kinds of infringing
acts:
44. Ikea Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd. (1999) Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 86 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 86] (China). In this case, Ikea Co. Lid obtained registration for its trademark "Ikea" in China in 1983. Id. Beijing Guo Wang Co.
Ltd reserved domain name "www.ikea.com.cn" in 1997. Id. Ikea sued Guo Wang for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Id. Although this is not a typical case that
Paris Convention needs to apply since the plaintiff had registered its well-known trademark "Ikea" in China, the court was given an opportunity to shed light on the abovementioned question because the parties argued on the applicability of Paris Convention. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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1. To use a trademark that is identical with or similar to a registered
trademark in respect of THE SAME OR SIMILAR GOODS without the authorization of the proprietor of the registered trademark;
2. to sell goods that he knows bear a counterfeited registered trademark; [and]
3. to counterfeit, or to make, without authorization, representations of
a registered trademark of another person, or to sell such representations of a registered trademark as were counterfeited, or made
47
without authorization.
In addition to these, Article 38 has an ambiguous "other" stipulation
which says that acts "to cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right of another person to use a registered trademark" constitute
trademark infringement. Article 41 of the Detailed Rules explained the
meaning of "other" respects. It says one of the following acts shall be an
act of infringement on the exclusive right to the use of a registered trademark as mentioned in Article 38(4) of the Trademark Law:
1. Selling, where the seller knows or should have known, goods which
have infringed the exclusive right to the use of others' registered
trade marks;
2. using, on the same or similar goods, words or graphs which are
identical with or similar to that of others' registered trade marks as
the designation or adornment of the goods, and which is sufficient
to cause mis-recognition; [and]
3. providing intentionally such convenient facilities as warehouse,
transportation, postal mailing, or concealment for the act of infringement on the exclusive right to the use of others' registered
48
trade marks.
There is no authoritative explanation as to whether this list in Article 41 of the Detailed Rules is exhaustive. If a court takes it as exhaustive, any acts which differs from that which is specified in Article 38(1),
(2), (3) and Article 41(1), (2), (3) is not an infringing act. If one studies
these specified infringement acts carefully, it is not hard to find that the
necessary conditions of infringement are: first, the defendant uses a
trademark which is identical or similar to the plaintiffs registered trademark; and second, the defendant uses the mark on goods or services
which are identical or similar to those of plaintiffs (or the defendant contributes to an infringing act meeting both requirements). As discussed
earlier, given the character of cybersquatting, if a court follows these
rules strictly, it is almost impossible for it to find trademark infringe47. Arguably, reservation (and use) of another's trademark as a domain name, especially when accompanied by an attempt to sell the domain name to others may fall into this
category. However, as far as recorded by the court decisions, no plaintiff has quoted this
Article 38 of the Trademark Law in any decided case, nor has any court addressed this
issue.
48. Detailed Rules, supra n. 7, at Art. 41.
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ment in any cybersquatting case. Unfortunately, in almost all the trademark infringement cases, these rules are strictly followed. The following
acts as an example.
In Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye,4 9 the court made it very clear that "according to Article 38 of the Trademark Law, an act to use other's registered trademark on identical or similar goods constitutes trademark
infringement. The defendant's act to reserve 'PDA' as a domain name
differs from using plaintiffs registered trademark on identical or similar
goods." 50 The court went further to say, "although according to Article
38, acts 'to cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right of
another person to use a registered trademark' constitute trademark infringement, Article 41 of the Detailed Rules lists the acts mentioned in
this clause, which do not include the defendant's acts and this list is exhaustive. Therefore, the defendant's acts do not fulfill the condition stipulated in the Trademark Law, thus do not infringe the plaintiffs
51
trademark right."
Therefore, trademark infringement will never be established if the
defendant merely reserves another's trademark as their domain name.
Nor can infringement be established even when the defendant uses the
domain name to advertise goods or services, as long as the goods or services of the defendant are different from those of the plaintiff. It is fair to
say that this list of infringement acts and the narrow reading of the list
is favorable to cybersquatters.
3.

Remedy

The remedy of a court after the establishment of an infringement is
stipulated not in the Trademark Law or its Detailed Rules, but in General Principle of Civil Law: "If . . . rights to exclusive use of trademarks... of citizens or legal persons are infringed upon by such means
as plagiarism, alteration or imitation, they shall have the right to demand that the infringement be stopped, its ill effects be eliminated and
the damages be compensated for." 5 2 According to this article, when
courts find the defendant's reservation and use of a domain name infringe the plaintiffs trademark right (which is very hard), they are able
to grant an injunction to stop the defendant's future use of the domain
name, they can also grant damages if there is any actual damage proven.
49. Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye, [19991 Yi Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 48 [Beijing First Intermediate
Court IP First Trial No. 48] (China). For the basic facts of this case, see supra n. 41.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. General Principle of Civil Law, Art. 118 (China) [hereinafter Civil Law].
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Comments

Like in the United States, using traditional trademark infringement
as a cause of action against cybersquatting in China also has a number of
limitations. First, only registered trademarks are qualified to enjoy the
protection of the TrademarkLaw, and even registered trademark owners
do not enjoy exclusive right other than to use the trademark on its goods
or services. Second, emphasis on "use on identical or similar goods" as a
standard of infringement acts give plaintiffs a very hard time in establishing trademark infringement. Due to these limitations, the traditional trademark infringement claim is not very helpful to trademark
owners in China as related to domain name use.
5. A New Approach: Special Protection For Well-Known Trademark
Judging only from the above case, it seems that trademark infringement is of little use to plaintiffs in cybersquatting cases. However, Chinese courts have made some courageous attempts to break the limitation
of "use on identical or similar goods." A test aiming to gives well-known
trademark special protection has been used in addition to the aforementioned traditional analysis.
The basis for "special protection" is that the well-known trademark
is more vulnerable to infringement and thus shall enjoy higher levels of
protection. Therefore, the coverage of the trademark right of well-known
trademark shall expand to include the exclusive right to reserve and to
use the trademark on goods or service of different category and to enjoin
others from doing so. It will even include the exclusive right to reserve
and use the trademark as a domain name and to enjoin others from doing so. What is more, the act of reserving and/or using an other's wellknown trademark as a domain name should be added to the list of trade53
mark infringement acts.
Since special protection for a well-known trademark does not exist
in current the Trademark Law, as judges in a civil law country, Chinese
judges have worked very hard to find justifications for this courageous
progress from existing legislations. First, Courts attempt to make use of
the leeway left in Article 38 of the Trademark Law by announcing that
the list of infringing act in Article 41 of the DetailedRules is not exhaustive. 5 4 This explanation enables courts to find trademark infringement
53. Ikea Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [1999] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 86 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 86] (China).
54. The Procter& Gamble Company v. Beijing Tiandi Electronic Group Co., [2000] Yi
Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 49 [Beijing Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 49] (China). In
this case, P&G registered its trademark "Tides" on "Soap and detergent" in 1976. Id.
Tiandi reserved the domain name "www.tide.com.cn" on April 9, 1995. Id. The Web site
under this domain name introduce the organization, business, contact information of
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"stipulated by law" when the defendant did use another's trademark on
identical or similar goods or service. Second, courts justify this radical
progress, which is not supported by current legislation, by saying this is
in accord with the spirit of the ParisConvention, which is part of China's
legal system. 55 Based on this explanation, in these cases well-known
trademark protection is evolving, courts found infringement even if the
trademark is not used by defendant in identical or similar goods or service, but just reserved as a domain name.
Since this protection for well-known trademarks bares more similarities to dilution analysis that U.S. courts use than traditional trademark
infringement analysis used in Chinese courts, it will be discussed in the
next section, to compare with dilution from the United States. However,
this arrangement, which makes the comparison more convenient, does
not imply that China has adopted "trademark dilution" as a new cause of
action.
III.

TRADEMARK DILUTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR WELL-KNOWN
TRADEMARKS IN CHINA
A.

DILUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

Prior to the passage of the Anti-CybersquattingConsumer Protection
Act, dilution had been the trademark owners' primary cause of action
against cybersquatters. 56 Unlike trademark infringement by the likelihood of confusion test, dilution does not require plaintiffs to prove the
likelihood of confusion. This change is helpful to trademark owners.
However, although courts have interpreted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("Dilution Act") and its "famous," "commercial use," "in commerce" and "dilution" requirements broadly enough to enjoin many
instances of cybersquatting, 5 7 there are still some instances beyond the
Tiandi Electronic Group Co. Id. When P&G asked Tiandi to transfer the domain name to
P&G, Tiandi asked for the price of around RMB 700,000.00 yuan, while the reservation fee
for the domain name was RMB 300.00 yuna. Id. P&G sue Tiandi for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Id.
55. In Proctor & Gamble v. Tiandi, the court opinioned that "Paris Convention established protection system for well know trademark and required its members to provide to
well-known trademark special protection which is in a higher level than that provided to
common registered trademarks .... This higher level of protection can be explained as a
protection expanding to enjoining the use of the trademark on non-identical and non-similar goods or service."
56. Jason M. Osborn, Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes: ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 209, 225 (discussing using FederalDilution Act of 1995 against cybersquatting).
57. Id. at 226-27.
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reach of the DilutionAct. Stretching the meaning of the DilutionAct and
these requirements itself has negative effects. Therefore, dilution is also
not a perfect tool against cybersquatting.
According to DilutionAct, to obtain an injunction under this section,
plaintiff must plead and prove that:
1. The plaintiff is the owner of a mark which qualifies as a "wellknown" mark as measured by the totality of the eight factors listed
in § 43(c)(1);
2. the defendant is making commercial use;
3. in interstate commerce of a mark or trade name;
4. and defendant's use began after the plaintiffs mark became wellknown; [and]
5. and defendant's use causes dilution by lessening the capacity of the
58
plaintiffs mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.
The following analysis on right and liability is organized basically
according to the elements of a prima facie case for an injunction against
dilution under the Dilution Act.
1.

Right

Only the owner of a "famous mark" is under the protection of the
Dilution Act. 5 9 The Dilution Act provides eight factors to be surveyed
and weighed in determining whether a mark is "distinctive and wellknown."60 Although the wording of "distinctive and well-known" in the
introduction to § 43(c)(1) causes different understanding of the standard
of a mark protected by the Dilution Act, 6 1 it is agreed that merely dis58. McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 23:89.

59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
60. Id.
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to-A. the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; B. the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services with which the mark is used; C. the duration and extent
of advertising and publicity of the mark; D. the geographical extent of the trading
area in which the mark is used; E. the channels of trade for the goods or services
with which the mark is used; F. the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought; G. the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and H. whether the mark was registered under the
Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.

Id.
61. Id. at § 1125(c)(1). The owner of a "famous mark" is entitled to remedy against
violation of the Act when certain other conditions are met. Id. Therefore, as far as fame is
concerned, the statutory qualification for remedy for violation of the Act is the mark's being
"famous." Id. However, the wording that 'in determining whether a mark is distinctive
and famous, a court may consider factors such as. . ." causes some confusion: legislative
history shows that the genesis of the language contained in the 1996 federal Act, said that
the dual mention of both "distinctive and famous" in the introduction to the list of factors
was inserted to emphasize the policy goal that to be protected, a mark had to be truly
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tinctive is not enough to trigger dilution. 6 2 Legislative history intended
that the courts should be discerning and selective in dubbing a mark
"well-known" so as to qualify for protection against dilution. Thus, to be
protected, a mark must be truly prominent and renowned. To be capable
and
of being diluted, a mark must have a degree of distinctiveness
"strength" beyond that needed to serve as a trademark. 63
Therefore, although "distinctive" is used here, the qualification for
protection under the Dilution Act is different from the "distinctiveness"
as the basic trademark requirement that a designation has to be "distinctive" either inherently to through acquisition for secondary meaning. Inherent distinctiveness or the acquisition of secondary meaning only
establishes the minimum threshold necessary for trademark status.
Neither of the above is near sufficient to achieve the status of "wellknown mark" under the Dilution Act. According to the 1987 Trademark
Review Commission Report ("The Report"), which is the origin of the languages contained in the Dilution Act, "distinctive and well-known" is to
emphasize the policy goal of the Act that for a mark to be protected, it
has to be truly prominent and renowned. The Report says that protection should be given to marks "which are both distinctive, as established
by federal registration at a minimum, and well-known, as established by
64
separate evidence."
Although the minimum requirement for federal registration was
dropped from the Bill for the Dilution Act, it is still clear that the Commission wants trademarks protected by the Act to be more than just distinctive. "In applying the anti-dilution statutes, most courts require that
the mark possesses a degree of distinctiveness beyond that needed for
prominent and renowned. Id. The language "distinctive and famous" reflected the goal
that protection should be confined to marks "which are both distinctive, as established by
federal registration at a minimum, and well-known, as established by separate evidence."
(Report of the T.R.C., 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 459-60 (1987)). McCarthy's view is that
"distinctiveness" in § 1125(c) is used not as a separate requirement, but merely as a synonym for "fame." McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 24:91. The Second Circuit developed its own
rule as to the interpretation of "distinctive and well-known" in Nabisco, Inc. v. PRF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208. According to the court, "distinctive" in § 43(1) of Lanham Act
constitute a separate and essential requirement for a trademark to receive protection
under § 43(1). Id. at 216-17. The court opined that some marks maybe "well-known" but
not "distinctive," the federal anti-dilution law does not protect "well-known" but common
marks. However, the court omitted to define the word "common" as used. Id. According to
McCarthy, "the Second Circuit has turned down a dead end street on this issue and must
reverse course sooner or later." As to the different understanding of "distinctive and wellknown." See generally McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 24:91.2; see also Nabisco, Inc. v. PRF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
62. McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 24:91.
63. Id. at § 24:109.
64. The Trademark Review Commission Report, 99 Trademark Rep. 375, 459-60
(1987).
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the designation to qualify as a valid trademark."6 5 This standard is also
66
applied in cybersquatting cases.
For example, in Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 6 7 the Ninth Circuit found that Avery Dennison failed to create a genuine issue of fact on
the famousness element of the DilutionAct. The court found that four of
the eight statutory factors of the well-knownness inquiry were satisfied
by their evidence of substantial investments in advertising made each
year, their high annual volume of sales, and their international operation. However, the court also found that although "Avery" and "Denison"
are surnames that have acquired secondary meaning, they are not wellknown because showing beyond mere distinctiveness is required for wellknownness. "Because famousness requires a showing greater than mere
distinctiveness, the presumptive secondary meaning associated with 'Avery' and 'Dennison' fails to persuade us that the famousness prong is met

in this case... "68
It is noteworthy that the statutory standard for well-knownness is
not always strictly followed. In practice, some courts assumed the mark
was famous and did not make an explicit finding of well-knownness.
Some court made the determination of well-knownness by confusing
fame with distinctiveness. 6 9 Specifically, where the court analyzed the
well-knownness inquiry according to the statutory factors, many courts
interpreted the requirement in the Dilution Act very broadly and found
that the plaintiffs marks satisfied the requirements. 70 Although the
purpose of broad explanation is to protect trademark owner, which is
65. Restatement (Third)of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. e (1995).
66. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11626, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that "Candyland" was found to be well-known and
therefore, the court found that the mark was diluted by tarnishment by using "candyland.com" as domain name for an Internet Web site showing sexually explicit pictures); see
also Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 287 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding that the mark
"Jews for Jesus" to be famous therefore, defendant's act to use "jewsforjesus.org" as a domain name for his Web site was intended to deceive and intercept persons looking for plaintiffs web site constitute a diluting use); see also PanavisionInt'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F.
Supp. 1296, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding "Panavision" to be a well-known mark and held
that it was diluted by a the defendant's use of the mark as a domain name); see also Toys
"R" Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, at **5-7 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
"toys r us" to be famous and found dilution by tarnishment by use of "adultsrus.com" as
domain name for sale of adult sexual products).
67. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 877.
69. Diane K. Wong, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law and
Technology I. Intellectial Property; C. Trademark Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 15
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 245 (2000).
70. Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at **13-15
(N.D. Cal. 1998); Levi Strauss & Co. v. San Francisco, 1996 WL 724786, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1996); Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1302-03; Augusta Nat'l Inc. v. Sir Christopher
Hatton, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21707, at **9-10 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Ringling Bros.-Bar-
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good, to give dilution protection to not well-known trademark is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Dilution Act. If courts do not observe the statutory standard for well-knownness, the application of the
Dilution Act will lack necessary restriction. As a result, there will be
danger of "moving toward a world in which 'famous' marks protected
even in the absence of confusion are the rule rather than the
71
exception."
All in all, if the trademark is not famous, it is not under the protection of the Dilution Act. Although the requirement for famousness may
be an unfavorable factor to trademark owner plaintiff, we can not abandon the requirement just to satisfy the need of trademark owners on the
price of a larger danger. Therefore, it is required that the courts, by expanding and devaluing the category of "famous" marks, apply a72legal tool
specifically aimed at the actions of the typical cybersquatter.
2.

Infringement

a.

Commercial Use Requirement

To constitute dilution of a famous trademark, the Dilution Act requires that the accused user make a "commercial use . . .of a mark or
trade name." 7 3 This means that the accused person must use the designation as a "mark or trade name" and as part of a "commercial use."
Commercial use usually implies a setting where some goods or services
are bought, sold, distributed, or advertised for sale.7 4 Therefore, mere
reservation of a domain name, without use in commercial sense, does not
trigger infringement by dilution under the DilutionAct. 75 As the district
court in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc. observed:
When a domain name is used only to indicate an address on the Internet, the domain name is not functioning as a trademark .... NSI's
acceptance of domain name registrations is connected only with the
names' technical function on the Internet to designate a set of computers .... something more than the registration of the name is renum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); WAWA Inc. v.Haaf,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
71. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
Yale L.J. 1687, 1699 (1999).
72. J. Golinveaux, What's in a Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting"Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F.L. Rev. 641 (1999).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
74. McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 25:76.
75. See Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1303 (holding that "registration of a trademark as
a domain name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark and is therefore
not within the prohibitions of the Act"); see Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that "something more than the registration of the name is required before the use of a domain name is infringing. . .. registration of a domain name, without more, does not constitute use of the name as a trademark").
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76
quired before the use of a domain name is infringing.
However, in practice, courts have "stretched" the meaning of "commercial use" to catch cybersquatters. 7 7 In some cases, courts have held
that reservation of a domain name plus the attempt for sale or offering to
sale of the domain name back to the owner of a trademark constitute a
78
"commercial use" sufficient to trigger the Dilution Act.
For example, in Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, the court granted summary judgment against Toeppen, even though he did not use the "intermatic.com" Web site in connection with the sale of any goods or
services. Rather, the court found that Toeppen's intent to ransom the
domain name back to plaintiff constituted a "commercial use" sufficient
to trigger the Dilution Act: "Toeppen's intent to arbitrage the 'in79
termatic.com' domain name constitutes a commercial use."
This practice to stretch the meaning of "commercial use" does help to
catch more cybersquatters. However, it also implies a danger to abuse
Dilution Act. McCarthy thinks that neither merely reserving a domain
name nor use of a domain name solely to indicate a site on the Internet,
in and of itself, constitutes "goods or services" in the Lanham Act sense.
Rather, one must consider the content of the site identified by the domain name.8 0 Stretching the meaning too much, the result may be inconsistent with the original legislative intent of the Dilution Act.

b.

Timing of the Acquisition of Well-Knownness

For injunction against the use of plaintiffs trademark by the defendant to be granted, the accused use must have begun after the time that
the plaintiffs mark has become famous. 8 1
c.

Dilution

Dilution means the lessening "of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or service, regardless of the presence or
absence of competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."8 2 One may violate the DilutionAct by dilution of a famous mark by either blurring or
tarnishment. In cybersquatting cases, courts have found dilution by
76. Id.
77. Lemley, supra n. 71, at 1699.
78. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. at 1227; Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1303
(finding that Toeppen's "business" is "to register trademarks as domain names and then to
sell the domain names to the trademarks' owners". . . thus finding Toeppen's acts meeting
the "commercial use" requirement).
79. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1227.
80. McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 25:76.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).

82. Id. § 1127.
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tarnishment, dilution by blurring and, when failed to find them, some
new type of dilution.
"Tarnishment can arise where the effect of the defendant's unauthorized use is to dilute by tarnishing or degrading positive associations of
83
the mark and thereby to dilute the distinctive quality of the mark."
For example, in Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., the
court held that the famous mark "Candyland," which was used on a children's board game, was diluted by tarnishment by the defendant's use of
"candyland.com" as domain name of an Web site showing sexually explicit pictures.8 4 And in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, the court found
that "Toys 'R' Us," a famous mark for children's toys, was diluted by being tarnished by use of "adultsrus.com" as a domain name for a Web site
advertising the sale of adult sexual products. The court held that,
"'Adults R Us' tarnishes the 'R Us' family of marks by associating them
with a line of sexual products that are inconsistent with the image Toys
85
'R' Us has striven to maintain for itself."
To find dilution by "blurring," the plaintiff must prove that the capacity of the mark to continue to be strong and famous will be endangered by the defendant's use. If a domain name is used for a commercial
Web site and the domain name causes "blurring," a junior user can be
enjoined from using the infringing domain name.
In some cases, courts did not rely on the traditional concepts of
"blurring" and "tarnishment." For example, in Intermatic Inc v. Toeppen
the court found that defendant's reservation of the domain name "lessens
the capacity of Intermatic to identify and distinguish its goods and services by means of the Internet." In Panavision International, L.P. v.
Toeppen, the court found that Toeppen's conduct diminished "the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's
goods and services on the Internet."8 6 In the latter case, the defendant
argued that he was not diluting the capacity of the plaintiffs marks to
ide "panavision.com" as domain name, it could still distribute or advertise its goods and services on internet by using some other domain names
and then creating its Web site using its trademark. Upon this argument,
the court opinioned that a domain name is something more than just an
address, and a significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the
entity that owns the Web site. Using a company's name or trademark as
a domain name is also the easiest way to locate that company's Web site.
Moreover, Internet users have the valid expectation that a company's
domain name is also the company's name or trademark. Potential cus83.
84.
85.
86.

McCarthy, supra n. 10, at § 24:95.
Hasbro, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *3.
Toys "R" Us, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, at *6.
Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1304.
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tomers of Panavision will be discouraged if they cannot find its Web site
by typing in "panavision.com," but instead are forced to wade through
hundreds of Web sites. This dilutes the value of "Panavision."8 7 Here,
the "discouragement" becomes a new form of dilution.
3.

Defense

The important defense that a defendant can use here is "non-commercial" defense in § 43(1)(B). According to the DilutionAct, non-trademark use-"fair use of a well-known mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the well-known mark" and "all forms
88
of news reporting and news commentary" cannot constitute dilution.
Legislative history indicates that the legislative purpose of "non-commercial" defense is to prevent courts from enjoining constitutionally-protected speech and to forbid the use of the Dilution Act to enjoin use of
well-known marks in "non- commercial" settings.8 9
Therefore, the Dilution Act should not be used to restrain uses of a
trademark in negative product reviews in the media or to restrain negative opinions expressed about company policies. For example, it is not
appropriate to use the Dilution Act as a weapon against criticism of a
company on the Internet, as with the use of the "xyzcompanysucks" type
of domain name for consumer Web sites devoted to criticizing the acts
and policies of "xyz Company." 90
4.

Remedy

First, the typical remedy against dilution is injunction. 9 1 Second,
actual damages can be granted upon establishing damage and willful dilution. 9 2 However, since it is hard for the trademark owner to establish
damage and willful dilution, most courts ended up ordering an injunction
without levying a monetary "punishment" against the cybersquatters. 93
It costs a cybersquatters only $35 a year to reserve a ".com" domain
87. Lemley, supra n. 13, at 805.
88. 15 U.S.C.§ 1125 (c)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).
89. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 § (4)(B) (Nov. 30, 1995).
90. See generallyBally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber,29 F.Supp. 2d 1161 (holding that use of the domain name "ballysucks" for a Web site criticizing the policies of the
BALLY health clubs is not a violation of the Dilution Act).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
92. Id. § 1117(a).
93. P. Wayne Hale, The Anti-CybersquattingConsumerProtectionAct & Sporty's Farm
L.L.C. v. Sportsman'sMarket, Inc., 16 Berk Tech. L.J. 205, 222 (2001) (discussing the lack
of deterrence of the Dilution Act).
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name,9 4 if it lose an trademark suit, it lose nothing but the domain
name, but if it successfully sells the domain name to someone, he may
obtain a large amount of money. Therefore, even if the Dilution Act
made cybersquatting unlawful, if the liability the cybersquatter faced
was not greater than the expected profit multiplied by the chance of
95
making a sale, cybersquatting would not be deterred.
5.

Comments

When trademark owners sue cybersquatters based on trademark dilution, courts are sometime faced with a dilemma: they could either let a
cybersquatter go, or abuse the Dilution Act to catch him. As we have
seen, courts have interpreted the "famous," "commercial use," "in commerce" and "dilution" requirements in the Dilution Act broadly in order
to catch more cybersquatters. Since a typical cybersquatter does not use
the reserved domain name as its mark, there is no traditional dilution by
blurring or tarnishment, thus, the courts even have created a wholly new
category of "dilution" in order to find a legal weapon to combat this new
and different form of reprehensible commercial activity. However,
stretching the law to reach justice for trademark owner may harm bigger
justice. It is fair to say that court dropped into the dilemma just because
it tried to use dilution, an inappropriate tool to solve this problem. To
come out of the dilemma, another appropriate tool need to be found.
B.

SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARK IN CHINA

As mentioned in Part II, Section 2, subsection e of the text, the basis
of the special protection for well-known trademark is that it is more vulnerable to infringement and shall enjoy higher level of protection.
Therefore, the scope of trademark right of well-known trademark should
expand to include, for example, the exclusive right to reserve and use the
trademark as domain name and to enjoin anothers from doing so. The
act to reserve and/or use other's well-known trademark should be added
to the list of trademark infringement acts. In order to justify this new
approach, courts make use of an expression in Article 38 of the Trademark Law, the prejudice in "other" respects to the exclusive right of
trademark right, as legal basis. Also, court claims that this approach is
in accord with the principle of the ParisConvention to support the legitimacy of the approach.
Due to lack of specific basis in current legislation and the ensuing
controversy as to the legitimacy of the "special protection," Chinese
courts pierce the veil the special protection slowly and cautiously. In Fu94. Network Solutions Inc., Web Address Registration: What Does It Cost? <http:l
www.networksolutionscom/catalog/domainname/> (accessed Jan. 16, 2003).
95. Hale, supra n. 93, at 222.
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lande v. Mitian Jiaye, which is the first case that the court was given a
chance to decide whether cybersquatting constitutes trademark infringement, the court did not consider "special protection" at all and decided
that there is no trademark infringement. 96 In the case that came immediately after Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye, Ikea v. Guo Wang, the court considered special protection but was cautious enough not to speak it out.
The court '"id"the inquiry of special protection for well-known trademark among unfair competition analysis, failed to mention whether
trademark infringement was established in it's holding, and avoided invoking any article of the Trademark Law as basis of its decision. 9 7 After
that, in all the following cases, courts made it very clear in their judgments that defendants' acts to reserve and/or use anothers' well-known
98
trademark constituted trademark infringement.
It is noteworthy that the applicability of this inquiry or even the possible result from this inquiry-cybersquatting may constitute trademark
infringement-is still being questioned. The Guiding Opinions from
Beijing Higher People's Court 9 9 clarifies that "reservation or theft of
anothers' well-known trademark as domain name in bad faith" constitutes unfair competition,1 0 0 but this document does not even mentioned
whether this act constitutes trademark infringement. Although it did
not deny that this act might constitute trademark infringement, at least,
Beijing Higher People's Court sent out a message that it does not support
the idea that this act constitutes trademark infringement. The Interpretations from the Supreme People's Court also cast doubt on the legitimacy of the inquiry. According to The Interpretations, when the
defendant's acts to reserve, to use a domain name meets certain conditions, one of which is "the defendant's domain name or its main part con96. Fulandev. Mitian Jiaye, [1999] Yi Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 48 [Beijing First Intermediate
Court IP First Trial No. 48] (China).
97. Ikea Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [1999] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 86 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 86] (China).
98. See P&G Co. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [2000] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 27 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 27] (China) (holding that reserving P&G's
trademark "Whisper" as domain name "www.whisper.com.cn" constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition); P&G Co. v. Shanghai Chenxuan Technology Development Co. Ltd., [2000] Hu Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi [Shanghai Second Intermediate Court IP
First Trial No. 23] (China) (holding that defendant's act of reserving the plaintiffs trademark "Safeguard" as domain name "www.safeguard.com.cn" constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition); Du Pont v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [2000] Yi Zhong Zhi
Chu Zi 11 [Beijing First Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 11] (China) (holding that
defendant's act of reserving the plaintiffs trademark "Du Pont" as domain name
"www.dupont.com.cn" constituted trademark infringement and unfair competition).
99. The Guiding Opinions function as a reference for Beijing courts.
100. Several Guiding Opinions Concerning the Hearing of Intellectual Property Civil
DisputesArising From the Registrationor Use of Domain Names, Arts. 4, 5 (China) [hereinafter Guiding Opinions].
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stitutes reproduction, imitation, translation or transliteration of
plaintiffs well-known trademark," the court should hold that the acts
constitute "infringement or unfair competition." 10 1 The Supreme People's Court seems to intentionally avoid saying that such actions may
constitute "trademark infringement." What is more, in the preface of
The Interpretations,the TrademarkLaw is not among the laws that form
the legal basis of The Interpretation.10 2 Here comes the message: Supreme People's Court is not positive that cybersquatting may constitute
trademark infringement, and it is not even positive of the applicability of
the Trademark Law in cybersquatting cases.
However, whatever the future of this inquiry might be, some courts
are now using it in cybersquatting cases. Therefore, it is necessary to
discuss how Chinese courts apply it in cybersquatting cases.
1.

Fame

Being well-known is the precondition of receiving special protection
in Chinese courts. In Dupont v. Guo Wang, the court opined that wellknown trademarks need to receive special protection which is at a higher
level than that provided to common registered trademarks. This higher
level of protection means a protection expanding to enjoining the use of
the trademarks on non-identical and non-similar goods or services. Due
to the fact that Internet has became a tool necessary for the survival and
development of an enterprise, this protection shall also expand to enjoin
101. Explanationof the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Law to the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Involving Computer Network Domain
Names, Art. 4 (China) [hereinafter The Interpretations].
When judging domain name dispute cases, the people's court should hold the defendant's acts to reserve, use the domain name constitute infringement of unfair
competition when each of the following conditions is met: (1) The civil right and
interest that the plaintiff pleads to be protected is legitimate an valid; (2) the defendant's domain name or its main part constitutes reproduction, imitation, translation or transliteration of plaintiff's well-known trademark; or is identical or
similar to plaintiffs registered trademark, so as to cause relevant public's confusion; (3) the defendant does not enjoy right or interest as to the disputed domain
name or its main part, it also does not have a legitimate reason to reserve, to use
the domain name; and (4) the defendant bears bad faith in the reservation, use of
the domain name.
Id.
102. Id. § Preface.
In order to correctly apply laws to civil cases involving acts to reserve, use computer network domain names (hereinafter referred as domain name dispute
cases), according to stipulations in General Principles of Civil Law of the People's
Republic of China (hereinafter referred as General Principles of Civil Law), AntiUnfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred as
Anti-Unfair Competition Law), Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of
China [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law] and other laws, make the following
interpretations.
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the reserving of the well-know trademark's domain name. 10 3 Also, in
Ikea v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., Procter& Gamble Co. Ltd. v. Beijing
Guo Wang Co. Ltd.,10 4 Procter & Gamble Co. Ltd. v. Shanghai Chen
Xuan Technology Development Co. Ltd., 10 5 Du Pont Company v. Beijing
Guo Wang Co. Ltd., 10 6 and Procter& Gamble Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Tiandi
Electronic Group Co.,107 the courts respectively recognized "Ikea",
"Whisper," "Safeguard," "Dupont" and "Tide" as being well-known trademarks and held the defendants' reservation of their relevant domain
names constituted trademark infringement.
To the contrary, in Pfizer Inc. v. Shezhen Wanyong Info Net Co.
Ltd., 0 8 "Viagra" was not recognized to being a well-known trademark.
There, the court made it very clear that "as a trademark registered in
China, 'Viagra' is under the protection of Chinese TrademarkLaw. However, since it has not met the requirement for a well-known trademark,
the protection it enjoys cannot expand to enjoining other's use of the
mark on non-identical or non-similar goods, let alone to enjoining reservation of domain name." Therefore, the court held that the reservation
of "www.viagra.com.cn" does not constitute trademark infringement. 10 9
2.

Timing of Acquisition of Fame

In all the decided cases, Chinese courts have spent no words discussing whether the plaintiffs trademark became well-known in Chinese
market before the defendant reserved the domain name with CNNIC,
nor have they discussed whether the timing has any effect on the determination of infringement.
For example, in P&G v. Chen Xuan, which was decided for the plaintiff, the defendant reserved the domain name "www.safeguard.com.cn" in
January 18, 1999, and the evidence presented to the court which decided
that "Safeguard" was a well-known trademark include governmental
documents issued in 2000.110 Although this does not necessarily means
103. Du Pont, [2000] Yi Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 11 (China).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Pfizer Inc. v. Shezhen Wanyong Info Net Co. Ltd., [19991 Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 98
[Beijing Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 98] (China). In this case, Pfizer Inc.
obtained trademark registration for "Viagra" in China on November 28, 1997. Shezhen
Wanyong Info Net Co. Ltd [hereinafter Wanyong] reserved domain name
"www.viagra.com.cn" in July 1998. Pfizer claimed that "Viagra" is a well-known trademark, Wanyong's act constitute cybersquatting, trademark infringement and unfair competition. The court held for the defendant.
109. Id.
110. P&G Co. v. Shanghai Chenxuan Technology Development Co. Ltd., [2000] Hu Er
Zhong Zhi Chu Zi [Shanghai Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 23] (China).
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the court made a wrong decision in this case, if courts keep ignoring the
timing issue, a wrong decision is just a matter of time.
3.

Infringement

In some U.S. cases, courts have found "dilution" by means of
"stretching the law;" they have even created a new type of dilution. Similarly, Chinese courts have also given a broader explanation to "infringement," and have created a new type of "infringement." For example, in
Ikea v. Guo Wang, the court opined that, "since only one person can reserve 'www.ikea.com.cn,' [defendant's reservation of the domain name]
harmed the plaintiffs exclusive right to use its well-known trademark in
cyberspace, so it constitutes trademark infringement." 1 ' Here, standards for traditional trademark infringement are not even mentioned,
the court extends trademark protection into the Internet without giving
explanation. A new kind of infringement, preventing a well-known
trademark owner from using its mark in cyberspace, is created here. In
P&G v. Tiandi, the court found first, the defendant's act to reserve and
use "tide" as a domain name lowered the significance of plaintiffs trademark "Tide," "diluted the trademark." Second, defendant's reservation of
the domain name banned the plaintiff to use its trademark directly as a
domain name, thus preventing it from using its trademark on the Chinese Internet in the simplest way. Therefore the defendant's act constitutes infringement. 1 1 2 These findings are surprisingly similar to those
in Panavision case and Intermatic case.
As courts in civil law system country, these Chinese courts seem uncomfortable with creating a new "infringement" which is not expressively
stipulated in the statutes. Therefore, in these decisions, courts have
tried to justify the new "infringement" by emphasizing that the legal
practice shall keep up with the development of real life. They opined
that acts in cyberspace shall not remain beyond legal regulation; if a person other than the owner of the well-known trademark reserves the
trademark as a domain name, the owner will not be able to use this domain name. Even if the contents of the Web site under the domain name
has nothing to do with the goods or service that the well-known trademark is used for, or even if the Web site was not in use, the act of reservation itself prevents the trademark owner from carrying out its
trademark right on the Internet and harms the commercial value of the
well-known mark. Therefore, court should not be blind to these facts and
111. Ikea Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [1999] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 86 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 861 (China).
112. The Procter & Gamble Company v. Beijing Tiandi Electronic Group Co., [2000] Yi
Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 49 [Beijing Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 49] (China).
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shall not stick to the old standard. 113
Although Chinese courts have put some effort in finding justification
for the creation of the new infringement, there is one link missing in the
chain of their analysis: the plaintiffs inability to use its trademark on
the Internet and the reservation of the trademark domain name by the
defendant. In cybersquatting cases, one argument that a defendant
could make is that defendant's reservation of the domain name does not
harm the plaintiffs ability to use its trademark in the Internet, for example, even if the defendant reserves "www.sprint.com.cn," 1 14 the company can still use any other domain name, such as "www.sprint4u.com.
cn," "www.pindrop.com.cn," etc., to carry out its business through the Internet, with the help of search engines, consumers or perspective consumers are able to find the Sprint Web site; therefore, reservation of
"www.sprint.com.cn" does not necessarily harm the trademark owner's
ability to use its trademark on the Internet. The above link is vital for
the rebuttal of such an argument. In early cases, the Chinese court totally ignored this link, in later cases, such as P&G v. Tiandi, this link
was realized and briefly addressed: using a domain name exactly the
same as trademark is the simplest way that a trademark owner use its
mark on the Internet. This oversimplified analysis is far less convincing
11 5
than the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Panavisionv. Toeppen.
4.

Remedy

Remedies that a court can provide in such cases are the same as
other trademark infringement cases.
5.

Comments

Despite the controversy of its legitimacy, special protection for wellknown trademarks, as a tool against cybersquatting, shares at least one
limit with dilution protection in the United States. If a trademark is not
well-known, it cannot enjoy the benefit of being protected against
cybersquatting.
Furthermore, the special protection inquiry has some unique
problems. First, the timing that the disputed trademark became famous
has been ignored. Omission of this factor is unfair to a defendant. Even
if we put aside the doubt on the legitimacy of extending well-known
trademark protection into cyberspace, a trademark owner has the right
only when the trademark is well-known. Therefore, a defendant shall
not be liable for reservation of a trademark domain name before the
113.
Second
114.
115.

P&G Co. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [2000] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 27 [Beijing
Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 27] (China).
This is just a hypothetic example.
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316.
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trademark became famous, that is, before the trademark shall enjoy the
special protection.
Second, as to finding the infringement, there is no standard but the
vague rule that an act to prevent the well-known trademark owner from
using the mark in cyberspace infringes the exclusive right of the mark.
According to this rule, as long as someone reserved a domain name,
which is the same as a well-known trademark, infringement can be established. Sadly enough, there are no other concrete standards that a
judge can, or needs to follow. As a result, Chinese judges are enjoying
too large a discretion and there is a danger of abuse of this discretion.
The best way to solve this problem will be to set up some concrete standards as to different aspects of cybersquatting in a special legislation. As
the United State's practice, which will be discussed later, shows, this
method can be satisfactory in dealing with cybersquatting.
IV.

UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA
A.

UNFAIR COMPETITION

1 16

There is no article dealing with cybersquatting in the Unfair Competition Law, which was promulgated in 1993. Courts have applied general articles of this law to cybersquatting cases. One of these general
articles stipulated that in carrying on transactions in the market, operators shall follow the "principles of voluntariness, equality, fairness, hon11 7
esty and credibility, and generally recognized business ethics.
Another general article defines "unfair competition" as acts of operators
that "contravene the provisions of this Law, with a result of damaging
the lawful rights and interests of other operators, and disturbing the socioeconomic order."" 8 According to these two articles, if an operator
does not follow the above principles, which are of course "provision of this
Law," it meets the first requirement for unfair competition. If, as a result, it damages the lawful rights and interests of other operators, it
meets the other requirement for unfair competition, and on the whole
constitutes unfair competition. Applying these stipulations in cybersquatting cases, it is easy to find cybersquatting constitute unfair competition. Even if a cybersquatter does not activate the domain name that
116. The Guiding Opinions issued by Beijing Higher People's Court addresses the
application of Unfair Competition Law in domain name dispute cases, but this part will not
discuss this Guiding Opinions since it does not function as a document of general binding
force, but just as a reference for lower courts in Beijing. It makes more sense to discuss the
Guiding Opinions in Part V of the accompanying text, as a part of the blueprint for future
special legislation.
117. Counter Unfair Competition Law, Art. 2 (China) [hereinafter Unfair Competition
Law].
118. Id. at Art. 21.
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he reserved, as long as he reserved a domain name, which is the same as
another's trademark, it won't be wrong to say the act is against "the principle of voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty and credibility," or
"generally recognized business ethics." That is to say, contravention of
law can always be found. Therefore, as long as damage to lawful right
and intervention of socioeconomic order exist, a court can decide cybersquatting constitutes unfair competition.
In P&G v. Guo Wang and Ikea v. Guo Wang, Beijing Second Intermediate Court talked a lot on why Guo Wang's acts contravene the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that Guo Wang knew or had
reason to know that "Whisper" and "Ikea" were others' well-known trademarks with high commercial value. When Guo Wang reserved the domain names exactly the same as these well-known trademarks, its real
purpose was not to reserve and use them, but to sell them back to the
trademark owners for profit. Therefore, Guo Wang failed to follow the
principle of honesty. Guo Wang had also reserved large number of domain names, which are the same as many well-known trademarks, and
all of the domain names were idle at the time of trial. This further
proved Guo Wang's dishonesty. By not following the principle of honesty,
Guo Wang's acts contravened the Unfair Competition Law. At the same
time, the court found Guo Wang's acts caused damage to P&G's and
Ikea's right to use its own well-known trademark. 1 19 Therefore, Guo
120
Wang's acts constitute unfair competition.
In P&G v. Tiandi, the Beijing First Intermediate Court elaborated
comparatively more on the damage side. It found that through reserving
and using a domain name that is the same as P&G's well-known trademark, "Tide," Tiandi lured Internet user who wanted to visit P&G's Web
site into Tiandi's Web site, thus raised the visiting rate of its own Web
site. Therefore, first, Tiandi took advantage of P&G's goodwill without
119. P&G Co. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [2000] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 27 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 27] (China); Ikea Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Guo
Wang Co. Ltd., [1999] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 86 [Beijing Second Intermediate Court IP First
Trial No. 86] (China). Both trademark infringement and unfair competition were issues in
this cases. In the judgments, since the court addressed the damage caused to P&G and Ikea
when it analyzed trademark infringement issue, the court assumed the damage in term of
unfair competition without giving an analysis.
120. P&G Co. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [2000] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 27 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 271 (China). The court did not give any words
on how it found Guo Wang's acts disturbed the socioeconomic order, which is also a necessary condition to find infringement. The court seemed to assume that Guo Wang's acts
disturbed the socioeconomic order. However, it is not fair to say the omission was a mistake, because Chinese judges are not expected to (and do not) make law. This is different
from the U.S., a judgment from Chinese court does not sit as precedent for itself and lower
court, thus is not considered as source of law. Accordingly, Chinese courts are expected to
make a righteous decision by applying the law "right," but are not expected to put all its
analysis into the judgment to make the law clear.

2002] DOES WHAT WORKS FOR -.COM" ALSO WORK FOR ".CN"?

573

compensation; second, Tiandi earned a illegitimate interest. At the same
time, Tiandi's act prevented P&G from making use of the fame and goodwill of its own well-known trademarks when it carried out business
through on the Internet, thus reduced this well-known trademark's
value as an intangible asset. Therefore, Tiandi's acts damaged the law12 1
122
ful right and interest of P&G, and constituted unfair competition.

B. REMEDY
Like remedies for trademark infringement, remedies for unfair competition also include injunction of the use of the domain name, cancellation of the domain name, and damages.
C.

COMMENTS

Although the Unfair Competition Law seems able to catch more
cybersquatters than the TrademarkLaw, it is not free of problems. One
problem is that unwell-known trademark's fate under the Unfair Competition Law is still not clear. Theoretically, the standard for unfair competition is different from those of trademark infringement, as a result,
there should be cases that reservation of a domain name, which is the
same as another's unwell-known trademark, does not constitute traditional trademark infringement, does not constitute infringement of wellknown trademark, but constitutes unfair competition. However, a gap
between theory and facts exists by now. Observing the results of all
cybersquatting cases the Chinese courts have dealt with so far, one can
find only two kinds of judgments: First, when the plaintiffs trademark
was recognized as well-known, the court found the defendant's acts constituted both trademark infringement and unfair competition. 123 Second, when the plaintiffs trademark was not recognized as well-known,
the courts found that the defendant's acts constitute neither trademark
infringement nor unfair competition. 124 From the results of these cases,
we have not yet found evidence that the Unfair Competition Law has
121. The Procter& Gamble Company v. Beijing Tiandi Electronic Group Co., [2000] Yi
Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 49 [Beijing Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 49] (China).
122. The court did not address on whether Tiandi's acts disturb the socioeconomic order.
123. See P&G Co. v. Beijing Guo Wang Co. Ltd., [2000] Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 27 [Beijing
Second Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 271 (China) (holding that the defendants acts
constituted trademark infringement and unfair competition); P&G Co. v. Shanghai Chenxuan Technology Development Co. Ltd., [2000] Hu Er Zhong Zhi Chu Zi [Shanghai Second
Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 23] (China) (holding that the defendant's acts constituted trademark infringement and unfair competition); Du Pont v. Beijing Guo Wang Co.
Ltd, [2000] Yi Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 11 [Beijing First Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 11]
(China) (holding the defendant's acts constitute trademark infringement and unfair
competition).
124. See e.g. Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye, [1999] Yi Zhong Zhi Chu Zi 48 [Beijing First Intermediate Court IP First Trial No. 481 (China).
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contributed to the protection of unwell-known trademark against
cybersquatting.
Another problem is that the standards in the Unfair Competition
Law are too vague to be "standards." Whether defendant's acts contravene "the principle of voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty and credibility" or "generally recognized business ethics," largely depends upon
the interpretation of the principle and the defendant's acts. Damages
can always be found if the trademark owner's being unable to use the
trademark domain name, per se, is deemed as damage. "Interference of
socioeconomic order" was assumed in all these cases. 12 5 Therefore, the
lack of a concrete standard for the above factors leaves too much discretion to the judges.
The practice in the United States has proven that traditional trademark infringement and dilution are not satisfactory weapons against
cybersquatting. The practice in China has also proven that traditional
trademark infringement, special protection of well-known trademark
and unfair competition are incapable of efficiently fighting against cybersquatting. Practice is calling for a satisfactory solution. The success of
the United State's special legislation, specifically the Anti-cybersquatting
Consumer ProtectionAct, is sending out an encouraging message: a special legislation might be what we are looking for.
V.

SPECIFIC ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND A BLUEPRINT OF ANTICYBERSQUATTING LEGISLATION IN CHINA

In 1999, United States Congress enacted the Anti-cybersquatting
ConsumerProtectionAct ("ACPA") which aims at preventing cybersquatting on the Internet by preventing the use of domain names that are
confusingly similar to trademarks and person's names. The trademark
portions of this Act outlawed the act of reserving, with the bad faith intent to profit, a domain name that is confusingly similar to a registered
or unregistered mark or dilutive of a well-known trademark. The in rem
jurisdictional authorization of ACPA permits court disposition of a domain name when the owner cannot be found or cannot be served in the
United States. What's more, ACPA also gives individuals special protections against the cybersquatting of their non-trademarked names, which
were not included as a part of the Lanham Act. As to remedies, ACPA
provides injunction and actual damages, which is the same as in traditional trademark infringement suit. In addition, ACPA offers a form of
statutory damages varying from $1,000 to $10,000 per infringing domain
name to be elected by plaintiffs at any time before final judgment instead
125. See supra n. 121, 123.
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of actual damages and profits. In in rem jurisdiction cases, the court
may order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the
transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. 126 Although
there are debates over whether ACPA has gone too far in sacrificing individual's right under constitution to satisfy trademark owner's needs, the
ACPA is generally a success.
After the ACPA had been proven successful in the United States,
China also began drafting legal documents that regulate disputes between domain name, trademark and other rights. The first attempt was
the Guiding Opinions issued by Beijing Higher People's Court. In November 2000, CNNIC issued the Draft Method for Resolution of Chinese
Domain Name Dispute ("Draft Method"). Although the Draft Method applies only to non-governmental dispute resolution of Chinese Domain
name 12 7 reserved with and maintained by CNNIC, 128 being a fruit of
collaboration of judges who deal with domain name dispute cases in
high-level courts, top intellectual property scholars and people from the
Internet service industry, 12 9 its significance goes far beyond the disputes
that it may apply to. On July 24, the Supreme People's Court issued The
Interpretations. All the above documents have shown that Chinese
judges and scholars have found the disputes between domain name and
other rights cannot be simply categorized into any kind of existing disputes, and can hardly be solved by merely applying existing rules. Considering the source of these documents, it is fair to say, if China will have
a special legislation, these documents are its predecessors.

126. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
127. See CNNIC, Ruhe Dengli Zhongwen Yuming [How to Register a Chinese Domain
Name] <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/cdns/howtoreg.shtml> (accessed Apr. 9, 2001). A Chinese
domain name refers to a domain name containing Chinese character(s). Id. There are two
kinds of Chinese domain names. One is pure Chinese-character domain name, whose second-level domain name contains Chinese character(s) and top-level-Chinese-character domain name is ".zhongguo(China)," ".gongsi(company), or ".wangluo(internet)." Id. The
other is domain name whose second-level domain names contain Chinese Characters and
top-level domain name is ".cn." Id. The holder of a ".zhongguo" domain name will automatically obtain a ".cn" domain name. Id.
128. CNNIC, Draft Method, Art. 1(a)(i) <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/doc/e-l.stml> (accessed Mar. 25, 2001). In addition to CNNIC, companies licensed by NSI have carried out
Chinese domain name registration in and out of China. Id. The State Quality Supervision
Administration also started its own "Chinese domain name registration trial system" in
March 2001. Id. The Draft Method does not apply to the dispute resolution of Chinese
domain names registered and maintained by those systems other than CNNIC. Id.
129. The Report on Draft Method of Chinese Domain Name Dispute Resolution by China
Social Science Academy <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/policy/lO.shtml> (accessed Mar. 25,
2001) [hereinafter CSSA Report].
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TRADEMARK CYBERSQUArrING

Any "mark" in the scope of the Lanham Act is under the protection of
the trademark portion of the ACPA. 130 According to the Lanham Act,
"mark" includes "any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark,"1 3 1 which includes both registered trademark and unregistered common law marks. The "mark" also includes "a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section."1 32 In addition to these
traditional "marks" protected by the Lanham Act, ACPA covers trademark, word, or name protected by special law, namely Olympic names
13 3
and the Red Cross.
b.

Infringement

According to ACPA, infringement by cybersquatting of a mark can
be established if the plaintiff pleads and proves the following elements:
1. The defendant has registered, trafficked 13 4 in or used a domain
name;
2. which is identical to or confusingly similar to a mark owned by the
plaintiff; or dilutive of a famous trademark (the goods or services of
the parties is not considered);
3. the mark was distinctive at the time of the defendant's registration
of the domain name; or is famous at the time of the defendants' reservation of domain name; [and]
4. the defendant has committed the acts with bad faith intent to profit
from the plaintiffs mark.
ACPA also provides nine factors that a court may consider when determining whether the defendant reserve the domain name in bad faith:
1. The trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name;
2. the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify
that person;
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
131. Id. § 1127 (2000).
132. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
133. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(a)(ii)(III). These marks are marks protected by 18 U.S.C.§ 706
(2000) (Red Cross symbols, including the words "Red Cross") and 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000)
(Olympic symbols, including the words "Olympic," "Olympiad" and "Olympia").
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(E) (2000). The term "traffics in" refers to "transactions that
include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration." Id.
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the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name13in5 connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
4. the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
site accessible under the domain name;
5. the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial
gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating
a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site;
6. the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the
or the person's prior conbona fide offering of any goods or services, 136
duct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
7. the person's provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name,
the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact infor3.

135. See e.g. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d

Cir. 2000). The use here has to be "bona fide" and "prior" to the reservation of the domain
name. Id. The court did not find defendant's use of the domain name in "bona fide" offering of goods or services because defendant's "Sporty's Farm," which sold goods on the Internet, was not formed until nine months after the reservation of the domain name
"sportys.com" and did not begin operations until after the lawsuit was filed. Id. The court
observed, "that entity did not exist at the time the domain name was registered." Id. at
499. Therefore, it found that while a defendant used the disputed domain name in connection with the offering of goods, it was a contrived attempt and did not occur until after the
litigation began, thus it did not constitute "prior" and "bona fide" offering of goods for sale.
Id. In this case, 'Sporty's" is Sportsmans's Market, Inc.'s trademark. Id. Omega is a mail
order company that was considering entering the aviation catalog business which is in direct competition with Sportsman's Market Inc. Id. Omega reserved the domain name
"sportys.com." Id. at 491. Nine months later, Omega formed Sporty's Farm LLC as wholly
owned subsidiary and sold it the domain name. Id. Sporty's Farm LLC used the Web site
located by the domain name to advertise its Christmas tree business. Id. Omega's CEO
testified that he named the company "Sporty's Farm" after a "childhood memory" of
"Spotty's Farm"-the farm where his uncle kept his dog "Spotty." Id. at 494.
136. See McCarthy, supra n. 10 at § 25:78. This factor embodies the conduct of the prototypical cybersquatter who registers a domain name with no intent to use it and offers to
sell it to the legitimate trademark owner. Id. This factor would also encompass cases in
which a defendant reserves a domain name and threatens to or actually offers to sell it to a
competitor of the legitimate trademark owner. Id.; see e.g. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Abir, 45

U.S.P.Q.2d 1944, 1948-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the defendant reserved the domain name
"toysareus.com" and offered it for sale to the owner of the Toys "1" Us trademark, informing the trademark owner that if the owner did not buy the domain name, defendant would
proceed to use it on a Web site for a worldwide toy catalog and toy store registry in competition with the trademark owner. Id. at 1946. The Court found, "[Defendant's] use of the
domain name that copied Toys "1" Us was a deliberate bad faith effort at cyberpiracy. ...
[Tihe defendant intentionally copied [the trademark] in order to extort money from the
plaintiff or take advantage of the extensive efforts that [plaintiffi expended in developing
the name by competing directly against the plaintiff." Id. at 1948.
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mation, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
8. the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of
such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are
famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without
regard to the goods or services of the parties; 13 7 [and]
9. the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the
meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this section.
In the first appellate decision under the ACPA, Sporty's Farm L.L.C.
v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., the Second Circuit found that the defendant's act constituted infringement because the defendant, being the
plaintiffs direct competitor, reserved and used the domain name
"sportys.com" with a bad faith intent to profit by preventing the senior
138
user "Sporty's" catalog business from utilizing that domain name.
The defendant's later attempt to legitimatize the use by creating a subsidiary called "Sporty's Farm" that sold Christmas trees at a Web site
located at "sportys.com" was denied a "prior," "bona fide" use. 13 9 The
court found that the following factors in §43(d)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act
supported a finding of bad faith: under the first and the second factors,
the critical date is the time the domain name was registered. In this
137. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 498. For example, the famous cybersquatter Dennis
Toeppen reserved about 240 domain names consisting of a who's who of trademarks, such
as "deltaairlines.com," "britishairways.com," "crateandbarrel.com," and "ussteel.com." See
generally Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1227; see generally Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1296.

This factor may also aim at a cyberpirate who registers multitudes of variations of others'
trademarks, not for the purpose of selling the names to the trademark owners, but for the
purpose of selling web advertising by intercepting Web users looking for the trademark
owner's site and making them click through advertising pages in order to escape. For example, in Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000), defendant registered
thousands of domain names including misspellings of trademarks and celebrities' names.
A Web user who reached one of defendant's Web sites was "mousetrapped" in the site,
unable to exit without clicking on a succession of ads, with defendant receiving between ten
and twenty-five cents from advertisers for each click. Id. at 635. Defendant was found in
violation of ACPA. Id. at 642.
138. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 489.

139. Id. at 494. Defendant told an involved story purporting to explain why it selected
its competitor's mark to register as a domain name "sportys.com." Id. Defendant's CEO,
Ralph Michael, testified that he always thought of his family's land in Pennsylvania where
the Christmas trees were raised as "Spotty's farm," and this was a name derived from his
uncle's farm. Id. When Ralph was a little boy, he had a dog named "Spotty." Id. Spotty
strayed. Id. Ralph's uncle took Spotty to live at the uncle's upstate New York farm. Id. So
little Ralph referred to uncle's farm in New York as "Spotty's Farm." Id. For some reason,
he transferred the name to the different farm in Pennsylvania. Id. Later "Spotty's Farm,"
for unexplained reasons, changed to "Sporty's Farm." Id. The court of appeals found this
story "more amusing than credible." Id. at 499.
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case, defendant did not have any intellectual property rights in the domain name at the time it reserved the domain name and the domain
140
Simname did not consist of the legal name of defendant at that time.
ilarly, under the third factor, while defendant used the domain name in
connection with the offering of goods (Christmas trees), it did not do so
until after the litigation began, negating its claim of a "bona fide" offering of goods for sale. The court emphasized that "the most important"
basis for a finding of bad faith was the finding that defendant registered
the domain name "for the primary purpose of keeping [plaintiff] from
using that domain name."
Here, ACPA not only provides a unique tool to protect trademark
from bad faith domain name reservation, at the same time, the bad faith
standard prevent the trademark owner from abusing the statute to interfere legitimate reservation and use of domain names.
c.

Remedy

In cases based on personal jurisdiction, when infringement based on
ACPA is established, courts may grant injunctive remedies of the Lan14 1
ham Act §34(a) and the monetary remedies of the Lanham Act §35(a).
In addition, ACPA offers a form of statutory damages as an alternative.
Instead of actual damages and profits, plaintiff may choose statutory
damages between $1000 to $10,000 per infringing domain name at any
time before final judgment. 142 In cases based on in rem jurisdiction,
ACPA expressly limits remedies to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the
owner of the mark. 143 Statutory damages provide enough economic deterrence against cybersquatting.
2.

Blueprint of Possible Legislation in China

This part of this article will sketch the outline of the possible special
legislation in China by looking at its "predecessors": The Guiding Opinions, the Draft Method and The Interpretations,and by considering the
possibility of leaning from the U.S. experience.
140. Id. at 498. Defendant's "Sporty's Farm" was not formed until nine months after
the domain name was registered and did not begin operations until after the lawsuit was
filed. Id. So although the challenged domain name was reflected in "Sporty's Farm," the
court observed that "that entity did not exist at the time the domain name was registered."
Id. at 499.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Rights

None of these documents uses the expression of "protecting" certain
rights. Instead, they specify the disputes that they are to deal with.
This implies that, in dealing with the mentioned disputes, these documents actually protect the rights, such as right on trademark, name of
organization, or other rights, against bad faith domain name reservation
or infringement acts, as defined in the documents. Guiding Opinions
deals with disputes between domain name and "registered trademark,
names of enterprises or other organizations etc."' 4 4 The Draft Method
deals with disputes between Chinese domain names and "trademark protected by Chinese Law," that is a registered trademark. 1 4 5 A trademark
that has been recognized as well-known trademark by Trademark Bureau of State Administration of Industry and Commerce gets special
treatment. 146 The Interpretation does not specify the disputes that it
deals with. However, one of the preconditions that the plaintiffs claim
being supported by the court is that "the civil rights 14 7 that the plaintiff
requests protection is legal and valid," 148 it implies that The Interpretation deals with the disputes between domain name and any kinds of civil
rights, and it protects any civil right. First, this stipulation means, as far
as trademark and related rights are concerned, unlike stipulated in the
TrademarkLaw, legal protection is no longer limited to registered trademark. Second, although Chinese courts have only received cases involving disputes between domain name and trademark or name of
organization, it is far too rashly to say it has ended all sorts of disputes.
This practical arrangement leaves plenty of room for future legislation to
49
protect all kinds of rights against bad faith domain name reservation.1
When drafting a special legislation against cybersquatting, it would be
rational to carry forward this arrangement.
144. Guiding Opinions, supra n. 100, at Art. 1.
145. Draft Method, supra n. 128, at Art. 2.
146. Draft Method, supra n. 128, at Art. 2(2). First, there is no time limitation for a
famous trademark owner to raise a complain against a domain name to the dispute settlement body (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Center), while a non-famous trademark owner has to raise the
complaint within two years after the reservation of the domain name. Id. Second, a famous
trademark owner does not need to prove that his business has been, or is likely to be
harmed by the reservation and use of the domain name, while other trademark owners has
to prove this in order to have his complain supported by the dispute resolution body. Draft
Method, supra n. 128, at Art. 7.
147. The term "civil rights" in Chinese law refers to any rights stipulated in civil laws,
such as Civil Law, Property Law, Copyright Law, Trademark Law, etc., as opposed to public laws.
148. The Interpretations,supra n. 101, at Art. 4 (China).
149. Protection of rights other than trademark rights will be discussed in different sections of this part.
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Infringement

These three documents follow different ways in establishing infringement. Guiding Opinions, and The Interpretations,being judicial
interpretations of the current Trademark Law and/or Unfair Competition Law, naturally rely more on current legislation and focus on building a bridge between old rules and new problems. The Draft Method,
being a rule of non-governmental dispute resolution, established a system independent from any existing law and regulations.
The Guiding Opinions does not mention the application of the
Trademark Law but merely mentions the Unfair Competition Law by
simplifying the process of applying the Unfair Competition Law into
cybersquatting cases. According to Guiding Opinions, when an act constitutes "bad faith domain name reservation," it constitutes unfair competition. To establish bad faith domain name reservation:
1. The registered domain name shall be identical or confusingly similar to the mark owned by the right owner;
2. the domain name holder does not enjoy any preexisting right of the
domain name; [and]
3. the domain name holder reserves and uses the domain name in bad
faith.
Here, factors for determining "bad faith" include but are not limited
to:
1. The domain name holder invites a sale, rent or other compensated
transfer of the domain name to the right owner;
2. the domain name owner, motivated by profit, lures internet users
into visiting its Web site or other online service by means of intentionally obscuring the domain name and the trademark or trade
name of the right owner;
3. the domain name owner reserves the domain name specially in order to obstruct the right owner to use its trademark or trade name
in domain name; [and]
4. the domain name owner reserve register trademark as domain
150
name in order to damage the goodwill of others.
Therefore, the Guiding Opinions sets the standard for bad faith domain name reservation and makes bad faith domain name reservation a
connecting point between any act and unfair competition act.151
150. Guiding Opinions, supra n. 100, at Art. 5.
151. Guiding Opinions, supra n. 100, at Art. 4. "The act to reserve, steal others' wellknown trademark as domain name in bad faith breaks the principle of honesty and credibility, breaks the generally accepted commercial ethics, constitutes unfair competition.
GeneralPrinciple of Civil Law and Counter Unfair Competition Law apply to such acts."
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According to the Draft Method, in order for the complaint against a
domain name to be supported, the trademark owner complaint shall
prove the following simultaneously:
1. The complaint enjoys legally protected trademark right;
2. the disputed domain name is identical to the
relevant trademark or
152
is sufficiently similar to cause confusion;
3. the domain name holder does not have trademark or other legal
rights in respect of either the domain name itself or to other combinations of characters including the domain name;
4. the domain name holder has registered and is using 153 the domain
name in bad faith; [and]
5. the complaint's business has already suffered or is extremely likely
to suffer damage because of the registration and use of the domain
name.154

"Bad faith" is the loudest "buzzing words" in the Draft Method. Evidence for "bad faith" includes:
1. The domain name holder has offered a sale of the domain name to
seek profit, and the price it sought exceeded the direct fees paid in
152. CSSA Report, supra n. 129. Here, "sufficiently similar to cause confusion" in item
two needs some explanation. Id. "Similar" may include any of the following situations. Id.

First, the registered domain name is identical with the legally protected trademark in the
combinations of characters, but differs in font, print, size or color. Id. at § 3. Second, part
of the registered domain name is identical with part of the legally protected trademark in
the combination of characters. Id. Third, part of the registered domain name is identical
with the legally protected trademark in the combination of characters. Id. Fourth, some
characters of the domain name are identical to some characters of the legally protected
trademark. Id. In addition to any of these situations, the complaint shall also prove that
the similarity between the registered domain name and the trademark is sufficient to make
consumers think that the domain name holder is the trademark holder, or at least has close
relationship with the trademark holder. In lack of such confusion, the complain shall not be
supported. Id.
153. Draft Method, supra n. 128, at Art. 11. "Use" here only means put the registered
domain name into use as the outside code of address of Web site, and guide the Internet
user into visiting certain Web site or Web page through decoding of the Internet system.
Id. It is not the "use" in term of this Draft Method to use the domain name not as the
outside code of Web address, but as identity of persons, products, Web site or Web page, etc.
Id.

154. See CSSA Report, supra n. 129. Damages to the trademark owner caused by the
use of domain name may occur in any of the following circumstances: First, the domain

name holder carries out business identical with or similar to that of the trademark owner's,
and manifests directly or indirectly that it is the trademark owner, or at least is associated
with the trademark owner in certain way, which is against the fact. Id. at § 3. This act will
certainly lead some of trademark owners perspective client to trade with domain name
holder, thus deprive the trademark owner of its business opportunity. Id. Second, the domain name holder use relevant Web page to remit information that damage the trademark
owner's image or the reputation, thus shake the trademark owner's stage in the market.
Id. Third, the registration of the domain name holder prevent the trademark owner from
using its own trademark as domain name, thus bring sever negative effect to the trademark owner's e-business. Id.; see also Draft Method, supra n. 128, at Art. 7.
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15 5

2.

3.

the registration process;
the domain name holder registered the domain name not for use but
in order to obstruct the trademark owner from using its trademark
or one of the constituents part of is trademark as a domain
name; 156 [and]
the domain name holder, motivated by profit, has intentionally registered the domain name in order to lure and mislead
Internet users
15 7
into visiting its website or other online addresses.

Evidence against "bad faith" includes:
1.

The domain name holder or any person closely related to the holder
enjoys legally protected right158or interest relating to the mark, which
compose the domain name;

155. CSSA report, supra n. 129. The Draft Method emphasis the situation that the domain name holder voluntarily offered transfer of domain name to the trademark holder or
sent invitation to offer to trademark holder. Id. Because voluntarily offer or invitation to
offer clearly shows that the purpose of the domain name registration is to seek profit
though domain name transfer. Id. This kind of acts takes advantage of the non-examination domain name registration system to infringe the right of trademark owner. Id. Allowing such act is against the basic policy of the development of Internet. Id. However, the
emphasis on voluntary offer and invitation does not exclude that "passive/invited" transfer
may be an evidence of bad faith registration and use. Id. For example, the domain name
holder knows that an voluntary offer may be an evidence of bad faith registration and use,
so it refrain its offer and use other means to manifest that the domain name is "for sale",
and while the trademark owner offered to buy the domain name, the domain name holder
asks for an unreasonably high price and shows the clear purpose to seek profit. Id. In this
situation, bad faith may also exist. Id.
156. The trickle thing in applying this article is the difference between actual "not use"
and "not for use." In business practice, it is normal that someone registers a domain names
and save them for future use. In some circumstance, the purposes of such registration is
just to prevent their own trademark, enterprise name or name being cybersquatted. Actual
"not use" in current does not necessarily means "not for use," save a domain name for future use may also be considered as use. Therefore, non-use after registration does not necessarily become evidence for bad faith in registration and use.
157. CSSA report, supra n. 129. In order to apply this condition to determine bad faith,
the complaint shall prove that: First, its trademark bears a high reputation in the market.
Second, the domain name holder knows or should know the existence of the trademark and
its reputation in the market, and intentionally registered the identical or similar domain
name to take advantage of the trademark. Third, the use of the domain name is to seek
profit, for example, carry out business through the Web site or Web page. See also Draft
Method, supra n. 128, at Art. 8.
158. See CSSA report, supra n. 129. When the domain name holder is a natural person,
the circumstances include: where the domain name is or is a part of the domain name
holder or his/her close relative's name, trademark or other legally protected mark. Id. at
§4. When the domain name holder is a working unit, the circumstances include: where the
domain name is or is a part of the domain name holder's or its chief manager's or its affiliated working unit's name, trademark or other legally protected mark. Id. The reason for
this kind of defense is that when the complained domain name holder or the registration
applicant enjoys legally protected right(s) other than domain name, the registration of relevant series of characters as domain name has "legitimate reason." Id. The legitimate reason can ultimately deny the existence of bad faith. Id.
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before being notified of the dispute, the domain name holder had
already stared making legitimate use of the domain name; or, in the
course of providing product or service, had used marks identical
with the domain name in good faith and had obtained substantial
reputation thereof;159 [and]
the complaint brought by the trademark owner amounts to "reverse
domain name hijacking."

It is not hard to find out that, from the structure of the documents to
the factors being considered when deciding bad faith, the Draft Method
has lots of things in common with ACPA.
Like the Guiding Opinions, The Interpretations also sets standard
for bad faith and make bad faith reservation and/or use of domain name
a connecting point. The difference is, in The Interpretations,bad faith
reservation and/or use of domain name not only connect an act with unfair competition, but may also connect it with any other kinds of infringement. According to The Interpretations,a court "should hold that the
defendant's acts to reserve, use domain name, etc. constitute infringement or unfair competition" when the act meets all the requirements:
1. The civil right and interest that the plaintiff request protection is
legitimate an valid;
2. the defendant's domain name or its main part constitutes reproduction, imitation, translation or transliteration of plaintiffs wellknown trademark; or is identical or similar to plaintiffs registered
trademark, so as to cause relevant public's confusion;
3. the defendant does not enjoy right or interest as to the disputed
domain name or its main part, it also does not have a legitimate
reason to reserve, to use the domain name; [and]
4. the defendant bears bad faith in the reservation, use of the domain
name. 160
According to The Interpretations,under one of the following situations, the court should held the defendant bears bad faith:
159. This condition includes the following possibilities. The first situation is, no matter
whether the domain name holder does not enjoy legally protected right relevant to the
domain name, when it registered and used the domain name, it did not know and had no
reason to know the existence of relevant trademark, nor did it know or have reason to know
the trademark's market reputation. The second situation is, no matter whether the domain
name holder knows the existence and the market reputation of relevant trademark, it did
not intend to take advantage of the trademark's market reputation by registering and using the complained domain name, and it use clear mark in its Web site or Web page to
distinguish them from those of the trademark owner's, for example, the domain name
holder states that it is not the trademark owner, or provide links to find the trademark
owner, thus does not cause actual confusion to the Internet user. The third possibility is
that although the domain name holder has not registered a trademark, it has used the
unregistered trademark relevant to the domain name in the course of providing product or
service, and has obtained its own market image and reputation.
160. The Interpretations,supra n. 101, at Art. 4.
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1. Reserve other's well-known trademark as domain name for commercial purpose;
2. for commercial purpose, reserve [and/or] use domain name identical
with or similar to the plaintiffs registered trademark [and or] domain name to intentionally cause confusion with the products, service or website provided by the plaintiff, so as to lure web users to
visit its website or other online site;
3. had offered to sell, to rent or to transfer the domain name by other
means in high price to obtain illegitimate profit;
4. reserve the domain name without using it or preparing to use it, but
to intentionally prevent right owners from reserving this domain
name; [or]
5. have other bad faith situations.
c.

Remedy

Under the Guiding Opinions, when unfair competition is established, the court may order the domain name holder to stop using the
domain name, to apply to the reservation agency to cancel the domain
name or to change the domain name. When this unfair competition acts
has caused damage to the right owner, the court should also give
damages.
Under the Draft Method, remedies that can be ordered by a dispute
resolution body are limited to an order for cancellation of the relevant
domain name, or an order for the relevant domain name to be trans16 1
ferred to the complainant.
According to The Interpretations,while infringement or unfair competition are established, the court may order the defendant to cease infringement, cancel the domain name, or order the reservation of the
domain name by the plaintiff. When defendant's act caused damage to
the right owner, the court may also give damages.
Looking at the three Chinese documents as a whole, there is one
remedy being given in the United States, but not in China: statutory
damages. As we mentioned before, since the cost for reserving and maintaining a domain name is low and even if infringement is established, it
is hard for the plaintiff to prove actual damage, so if the responsibility
the cybersquatter faced was not greater than the expected profit multiplied by the chance of making a sale, cybersquatting would not be deterred. Statutory damages can solve this problem well. It will be wise
for future Chinese special legislation to include this kind of remedy.

161. Draft Method, supra n. 101, at Art. 16 (China).
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JURISDICTION ISSUE

United States

ACPA allows a trademark owner to bring an in rem action against
the domain name itself. 162 Under ACPA, if the trademark owner cannot
obtain personal jurisdiction over the holder of the domain name, or if it
sends notice to the holder at both the postal address and the e-mail address listed in the registration and the holder does not answer, the trademark owner can then proceed in rem litigation against the trademark
itself. An in rem suit can be brought in the judicial district where the
registrar is located, or where "documents sufficient to establish control
and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the
163
domain name are deposited with the court."
One advantage of in rem suit is that cybersquatters can no longer
hide from trademark owners. An additional important advantage is that
as soon as the plaintiff gives to the registrar a file stamped copy of the
complaint, the registrar must freeze the domain name 16 4 and the registrar must deposit the domain name with the court.165
2.

China

In rem jurisdiction is not necessary under Chinese civil procedural
law. In China, a domain name dispute suit is an infringement suit. In
Civil ProcedureLaw of China, "A lawsuit brought on a infringement act
shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court of the place of infringement or place of the defendant's domicile." 166 According to this article, a plaintiff can always find a court that has jurisdiction over a
domain name dispute case in any circumstance. If the defendant has activated the domain name by using it to allocate a Web site, since Internet
167
users can log into the Web site from a computer anywhere in China,
any place can be place of infringement. Therefore any Chinese court
may have jurisdiction over the dispute. Even if the defendant just warehouses domain names without activating it, the place of the registration
is the place of infringement, so the plaintiff can still find a court with
jurisdiction. What is more, even if the defendant does not attend the
litigation, the court can still enter into an enforceable default judgment.
The Interpretationsstipulated that, "Intermediate People's Court of
the place of infringement or of the defendant's place of domicile has the
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
163. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(C).
164. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).
165. Id.
166. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 29 (China).
167. Actually, Internet user can log into the Web site from anywhere in the world, but
only the login from China has jurisdiction meaning under Chinese law.

2002] DOES WHAT WORKS FOR ".COM" ALSO WORK FOR ".CN"? 587
jurisdiction over infringement cases involving domain name. As to
[cases] in which it is hard to determine place of infringement or the defendant's place of domicile, the place of the computer terminal or other
instruments where the plaintiff found out this domain name can be
deemed as place of infringement." Therefore, according to Chinese law,
although without in rem jurisdiction, the defendant still cannot hide
from the plaintiff.
C.

1.

CYBERSQUATTING PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS

United States

According to ACPA, a defendant shall be liable for the cybersquatting of a personal name, if the plaintiff plead and prove the following four
elements:
1. The defendant has registered a domain name;
2. which consists of or is confusingly similar to the name of the plaintiff, who is a living person;
3. without the plaintiffs consent; [and]
4. the defendant has committed the acts with a specific intent to profit
from the plaintiffs name by selling the168
domain name for financial
gain to the plaintiff or any third party.
When an infringement has been established, a court may award injunctive relief, including the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or the transfer of the domain name to the plaintiff. The court may
also, in its discretion, award costs and attorneys fees to the prevailing
1 69
party.

D. CHINA
There is no legislation as to the dispute between a personal name
and a domain name in China. However, General Principle of Civil Law
provides legal basis for protection of personal name in cyberspace, provided that we give the article about personal name right a wide enough
interpretation. General Principle of Civil Law stipulates, "Citizens shall
enjoy the right of personal name and shall be entitled to determine, use
or change their personal names in accordance with relevant provisions.
Interference with, usurpation of and false representation of personal
names shall be prohibited.' u 7 0 Theoretically, the individuals' right to
"use their personal names" includes the right to use their name by
means of using their name as domain names. The right to prohibit "interference with, usurpation of and false representation of personal
names" shall also include the right to prohibit the interference with
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1129 (2000).
169. Id. § 1129(2).
170. General Principlesof Civil Law, Art. 99 (China).
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usurpation of and false representation of personal names by reserving
others' personal names as domain names.
Room for such regulation is also left in The Interpretations. The Interpretations deals with the disputes between domain name and civil
rights and interest, which may include personal name right. 17 1 The situations in which defendant's act should be held "infringement" (not only
trademark infringement) includes "the defendant's domain name... is
identical with or similar to the plaintiffs registered trademark, domain
name, etc." It is fair to say the "etc." includes personal name.
Although the two documents provide a basis and leave room for protection of personal name against cybersquatting, it also left many possible problems unsolved. For example, it provide no guide for dealing with
the situation when the domain name holder reserves a domain name
consisting of his own name but people who happen to have the same
name challenge the domain name. Nor does it help to deal with the situation that the domain name is not composed by the domain name
holder's "personal name," but by some other words that the domain name
holder has legitimate right other than trademark, for example, the domain name holder's pen name, nickname, stage name, which happens to
be the same as someone's "personal name." Until today, Chinese courts
have not yet had chance to deal with a case involving reservation of domain names consisting names of others. However, it is not hard to imagine the difficulty a court is to meet with when such cases appear. Only
basis and room for future legislation is not enough, therefore, again, specific regulation on this issue is suggested.

E.

COMMENTS

It is easy to find out that many elements in the ACPA, such as elements of infringement, evidences for and against bad faith, have been
adopted by the three Chinese legal documents. It is also easy to find out,
especially through The Interpretations,which China realized the complexity and uniqueness of cybersquatting, which can hardly be dealt with
by the current legislation. However, only realizing the problem is not
enough, dealing with the complex problem only with judicial interpretations is not enough either. As we mentioned, The Interpretations, although leaving room for protection of various rights and interests, is
chained by the current Trademark Law, Unfair Competition Law, General Principle of Civil Law, etc, which prevent it from solving many
problems. Therefore, a special legislation to maintain and to further the
achievement in the Guiding Opinions and The Interpretations is
necessary.
171. The Interpretations,supra n. 101, at Art 4.
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In future legislation, like in The Interpretations,the right being protected should include various civil rights and interest which include
trademark right, personal name right, etc. As to infringement, before
the character of domain name is clear, before the discussion of overlap
between domain name and trademark, personal name reaches a clear
conclusion, it is appropriate to deal just with bad faith domain name reservation. As to remedy, the future legislation should keep the remedies
listed in The Interpretations,and should add to a statutory damages or a
damages with similar function.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Internet has no boundaries, neither do problems arising from
the Internet. How to protect trademark and other intellectual property
rights on the Internet poses a global challenge to all modern countries.
China, having her legal framework of intellectual property protection
constructed only two decades ago, is still in her infancy to handle hightech intellectual property protection issues such as anti-cybersquatting.
In addition to learning lessons by trial and error, it might also be worthwhile for China to find teachings from such countries as the United
States which have more sophisticated legal systems. Unlike traditional
civil law issues, such as contract or tort issues, which could have significantly different natures in different countries due to diversity of culture,
history, economic backgrounds, domain name disputes, as a largely technology-generated problem, appears in different countries with considerable consistency. Accordingly, in spite of different legal philosophies
followed by the United States and China, it is possible and necessary for
China to extensively adopt the U.S. experience as reference in dealing
with its own cybersquatting problems.
Although China has made some achievements in regulating cybersquatting, there are still problems left unsolved. Traditional trademark
infringement has been proved unsuccessful to deal with cybersquatting.
Using the inquiry of "special protection for well-known trademark" or
applying the Unfair Competition Law may catch more cybersquatters,
but due to the immaturity of the former analysis and the "king clause"
nature of the Unfair Competition Law, judges are left with too little guidance and too much discretion in judging cybersquatting cases. The
Guiding Opinions and The Interpretations address the core issues of
cybersquatting, but they constructive restatements, rather than improvements, of pre-existing law. Therefore, a specific legislation on
cybersquatting following the model of ACPA is in urgent need in China
to mend the flaws of current legal mechanisms and sufficiently protect
trademarks and other intellectual property rights on the Internet.
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Appendix: Anti-Cybersquatting Legal Systems in the
United States and China
1.

GENERAL COMPARISON

United States
1. Trademark infringement based
on likelihood of confusion
Lanham Act §1114, §1125(a)
2. Dilution
Lanham Act §1125(c) (Dilution Act)

3. Cybersquatting
Lanham Act § 1125(d) (ACPA)

China
1. Trademark infringement
Trademark Law Art. 38, Detailed
Rules Art. 41
1. Special protection for well-known
trademark. (Used by courts, not
mentioned in legislation)
2. Unfair competition
Anti-Unfair Competition Law Art. 2
Art. 21
Future legislation
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TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT BY LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

United States

China

Right

*Registered
Lanham Act §1114
*Unregistered trademark
Lanham Act §1125(a)

oRegistered trademark only
Trademark Law Art. 3

Infringement

• Use in commerce
Lanham Act §1114, §1125(a)
* To use reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark
Lanham Act §1114 /any word,
term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact Lanham

e No requirement for use in
commerce
* To use a trademark that is
identical with or similar to a
registered trademark
Trademark Law Art. 38/ words
or graphs which are identical
with or similar to that of
others' registered trade marks
as the designation or
adornment of the goods, and
which is sufficient to cause
mis-recognition Detailed Rules
Art. 41

Act §1125(a)

e Use in connection with the
sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services Lanham
Act §1114/in connection with
any goods or services, or any
container for goods Lanham
Act §1125(a)
e Likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive
Lanham Act §1114, § 1125(a)
o Factors courts consider in
finding likelihood of confusion:
" competition between goods
o degree of distinctiveness of
the senior mark

e Use in respect of the same
or similar goods Trademark
Law Art. 38, Detailed Rules
Art. 41/sell such goods
Trademark Law Art. 38,
Detailed Rules Art. 41

* Implied in Trademark Law
and Detailed Rules

Fulande v. Mitian Jiaye

Planned Parenthoodcase.
Intermatic v. Toeppen
Remedy

I

9 Injunction

9 Injunction

Damages

9 Damages
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DILUTION/ SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARK

Right

United States
*Well-Knownness (more than
distinctiveness), registration
not required Lanham Act
§1125(c) Panavisioncase...
(Low standard in practice),
Avery case (High standard in

China
*Well-knownness and
registration Trademark Law
Art. 41; Tide case...

practice)
Infringement

*No such requirement
*Reserve and/or use a domain
name which is the same as a
well-known trademark (no
case about domain name
similar to famous trademark
yet)
Ikea case, P&G cases...
* To cause, in other respects,
prejudice to the famous
trademark owner's exclusive
right to use the trademark:
OThe "other" prejudice that
courts found out: Prevent the
trademark owner from using
the trademark in cyberspace
Ikea v. Guo Wang (Courts fail
to give an explanation as to
why such act harm the
trademark owner's right to use
the mark on internet while the
trademark owner can still use
a domain name containing its
trademark)
*This factor is ignored by
Chinese courts P&G v.
Chenxuan

eIn commerce
*Commercial use as a mark or
trade name Lanham Act
§1125(c) Intermatic, Inc. v.
Toeppen, (the court found
reservation plus intent to
arbitrage the domain name
constitutes a commercial use.)
*Likelihood of dilution:
o Blurring Toy"R"Us case
o Tarnishment
o "Discouragement": dilution of
the distinctive quality of the
trademark (Newly created by
courts) Panavision v. Toeppen
*After the mark has become
well-known

Remedy

*Injunction
eDamages if proven willful
. NO statutory damages
4.

*

j

*

Injunction
Actual damages
NO statutory damages

UNFAIR COMPETITION IN CHINA

Unfair competition refers to acts of operators that contravene the provisions of this Law, with a result of damaging the lawful rights and interests of other operators, and disturbing the socio-economic order. Unfair
Competition Law Art. 2
a. Contravene the provision of this Law
Principles: In carrying on transactions in the market, operators
shall follow the principle of voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty, and credibility, and observe generally recognized business ethics. Unfair Competition Law Art. 2
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b.

Harm the lawful rights and interests of other operators:
(1) Harm the right to use its famous trademark in cyberspace.
Ikea v. Guo Wang
(2) Take advantage of the good will of the trademark without
compensation. P&G v. Tiandi
c. Disturbing the socio-economic order-no analysis in any case. Assumed by courts.
5.

ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT/FUTURE
CHINESE SPECIFIC LEGISLATION
A.

TRADEMARK CYBERSQUATrING

United States

China

Right

A mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a
mark Lanham Act § 1125(d)

e Trademark right, right of
name of organization, etc.
Guiding Opinions
*Trademarks protected by
Chinese law Draft Method
* All relevant civil right and
interest Interpretations

Infringement

* Registers traffics in, or uses

* In bad faith for profit
o Holders IP right over the
domain name
o Holder's name
o Prior use in bona fide
offering of goods/service
o Bona fide use in a site
o Intent to divert consumer
o Offer to transfer
o Provision of false
information for reservation
o Multiple domain name
o Distinctive or well-known
e A domain name that
o Identical or confusingly
similar to a mark
o Identical or confusingly
similar or dilutive of a famous
trademark, without regard to
the goods or services of the
parties

* Register and/or use the
domain name Id.
* In bad faith
0 Legally protected other
rights
0 Bona fide use in offering
goods or on website
0 Offer to sell for profit
0 Prevent trademark owner
form using
0 Lure the consumers into the
website
0 etc. Id.
9 A domain name that
0 Identical or confusingly
similar to a mark
0 Over which the holder does
not enjoy trademark or other
legal right Id.
9 Trademark owner is very
likely to be damaged Guiding
Opinions

0 Injunction
0 Damages (including
statutory damages)
* Injunctions ordering
cancellation or transfer

9 Cancellation
e Actual damage
e Statutory damages is
recommended
* Transfer

Remedy
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JURISDICTION

United States

China

* Personal jurisdiction
" In rem jurisdiction Lanham Act
§ 1125(d)

a Court of the defendant's domicile
has jurisdiction Civil Procedure
Law
0 Court of place of infringement has
jurisdiction

C.
Right

Infringement

PERSONAL NAME CYBERSQUATTING

United States
* Name of a living person
Lanham Act § 1125(d)

e Register a domain name
which is identical or
confusingly similar to the
name of a living person
* with the specific intent to
profit from the name Id.

e Injunctive

o Forfeiture or cancellation
o Transfer
e Costs and attorneys fees Id.

China
* A citizens' right to use their
personal names (possibly
including the right to use in
cyberspace) General Principle
of Civil Law
* Interference with,
usurpation of and false
representation of personal
names

